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ABSTRACT
In anticipation of the return of samples from Mars toward the end of the first decade of the
next century, NASA's Office of Space Sciences chartered a panel to examine how Mars
samples should be handled. The panel was to make recommendations in three areas: (1)
sample collection and transport back to Earth; (2) certification of the samples as non-
hazardous; and (3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. This report summarizes the
findings of that panel. The samples should be treated as hazardous until proven otherwise.
They are to be sealed within a canister on Mars, and the canister is not to be opened until
within a Biosafety Hazard Level 4 (BSL-4) containment facility here on Earth. This facility
must also meet or exceed the cleanliness requirements of the Johnson Space Center (JSC)
facility for curation of extraterrestrial materials. A containment facility meeting both these
requirements does not yet exist. Hazard assessment and life detection experiments are to be
done at the containment facility, while geochemical characterization is being performed on a
sterilized subset of the samples released to the science community. When and if the samples
are proven harmless, they are to be transferred to a curation facility, such as that at JSC.
.°.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Charter of the Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel
In anticipation of the return of samples from Mars nearly a decade into the next
century, NASA in 1996 requested, that the National Research Council (NRC) advise the
agency on planetary protection issues connected with the return of samples from Mars to the
Earth. The N-RC appointed a Task Group on Issues in Sample-return (TGISR), and its
findings were published early in 1997 (National Research Council, 1997). In November 1997
NASA established the Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) to advise
how the recommendations of the NRC panel might be implemented. The panel was convened
by the Office of Space Sciences at NASA Headquarters, and it was to report to the Associate
Administrator for Space Sciences. It was chartered to recommend requirements in three
areas:
1. Sample collection and transport back to Earth
2. Certification of the samples as non-hazardous
3. Sample receiving, curation, and distribution.
The NRC reports on Biological Contamination of Mars and Mars Sample-return
(National Research Council, 1992, 1997) were to serve as guides in making the panel's
recommendations. MSHARP's concern is with sample-return. It is concerned with forward
contamination of Mars only insofar as it affects sample return.
The membership of MSHARP changed during the panel lifetime but included the following:
Michael H. Carr, Chair, U. S. Geological Survey, Menlo Park, CA
Jeffrey L. Bada, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, La Jolla, CA
Donald D. Bogard, Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX
Benton C. Clark, Lockheed Martin Astronautics, Denver, CO
Michael J. Drake, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ
Donald DeVincenzi, Ames Research Center, Moffet Field, CA
Daniel J. McCleese, Jet Propulsion Lab., Pasadena, CA
Kenneth H. Nealson, Jet Propulsion Lab, Pasadena, CA
James J. Papike, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM
Margaret S. Race, SETI Institute, Mountain View, CA
David Stahl, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Mars Exploration Goals
The focus of the Mars exploration program is the comprehensive goal of
understanding the suitability of Mars as a possible abode of past or present life. We wish to
understand Mars well enough to determine if some form of life ever evolved there, and if not,
why not. Present conditions at the martian surface are very hostile, but geologic evidence
suggests that the planet was more hospitable in the past. The initial emphasis of the program
is, therefore, to look for evidence of past life. Essential elements in understanding Mars as a
possible abode for life are determining the planet's climate and geologic histories and
achieving a better understanding of why they have been so different from the Earth's. These
are, therefore, parallel goals to the direct search for past and present life.
The martian surface is expected to be sterile because of the hostile conditions (see
summary of Mars surface conditions in Kaplan, 1988; Carr, 1996). These are such that liquid
water, which is universally held as essential for life, is unstable everywhere. The partial
pressure of water is approximately one microbar at the surface. Surface temperatures at the
equator typically range from -100°C just before dawn to peaks during southern summer at 0°
to 20°C, depending on the properties of the surface materials. Under these conditions, not
only is liquid water unstable at the surface, but at low latitudes ice is unstable. It will tend to
sublime into the atmosphere, and the water vapor will ultimately be precipitated out at the
poles. In addition to the lack of liquid water, 0.2-0.3 _m (2000-3000 A) ultraviolet (UV)
radiation from the Sun passes unattenuated through the martian atmosphere (Kuhn and
Atreya, 1979) and appears to cause breakdown of any organic molecules that may be at the
surface. The surface material is also oxidizing, thereby contributing further to the breakdown
of organics. As a result, the Viking landers found no complex organic molecules at the parts
per billion (ppb) level despite expectations of their presence at this level simply from
meteorite infall (Biemann et al., 1977). The martian surface and the dust in the
atmosphere are, thus, both expected to be sterile. If there is any life near the surface, it
would have to be within rocks or below the surface where there is protection from the UV
radiation, and it would also have to have the capability of sequestering water in the physically
unfavorable environment
Optimism that some form of life could have started on Mars arises not because of
present conditions on the planet, but because of indications in the geologic record that
conditions were different in the distant past. Large channels, seemingly formed by gigantic
floods, indicate that large quantities of water episodically flowed across the surface at times in
the past. Also the presence of numerous smaller dry valleys supports the supposition that, in
the very distant past, climatic conditions were such that liquid water could have been stable at
the surface (summarized in Carr, 1996). The time that most of these valleys formed is prior
to 3.5 billion years ago. We know that by this time life had started on Earth. We do not
know what happened on Mars, but both planets at this time had conditions that would seem
favorable to life: water-rich; high rates of volcanism; high rates of impact; and seemingly
wanner surface temperatures that allowed liquid water at the surface. The initial exploration
strategy is, therefore, to acquire samples of rocks that formed early in Mars' history and that
record the conditions at that time.
It has been argued that if some form of life did start on early Mars, when conditions
were more hospitable, then as Mars evolved to the hostile planet we know today, the
organisms could have adapted to survive in niches where liquid water was available and where
they were protected from the UV radiation and oxidizing conditions at the surface. Examples
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of suchpossiblenichesareaquifersthatmayexistkilometersdeepbelowthesurfaceor active
volcanicsystems,althoughthesehaveyet to bedetected.
Althoughdetectionof pastlife is a primarygoalof theexplorationprogram,it is not
theonly goal. Searchingfor evidencefor pastor presentlife onMars,whileenormously
important,is a high-riskventure,scientifically.Life maynothavedevelopedonMars,and
evenif it did,wemaynotbeableto immediatelyfind evidencefor it. Ontheotherhand,
anysamplesreturnedfromMarswill yield evidenceof theclimaticandgeologicevolutionof
theplanet. Moreover,theremaybeevidenceof pre-bioticchemistrythatundermore
favorablecircumstancescouldhaveledto theoriginof life.
Determinationof theclimatichistoryof Marsis of considerableinterest,notonly
for assessingtheprospectsfor pastlife andtheconditionsunderwhichlife mightarise,but
alsofor understandingtheearlyhistoryof theEarthandwhy theclimaticevolutionof the
two planetswassodifferent. Thegeologichistoriesof MarsandEarthhavealsobeenvery
different,andsampleswill enableusto understandwhy. These climatic and geologic goals are
of low risk scientifically in that returned samples will inevitably lead to their better
understanding.
A final practical goal for Mars exploration is to prepare the way for human
exploration. Of special interest is determining whether the omnipresent dust is harmful to
people or machines.
1.2.2 Sample-Return
Sample-return has long been a goal of Mars Exploration, and many of the outstanding
biologic, geologic, and climactic issues with respect to Mars are unlikely to be resolved until
we have a variety of returned samples. We already have, of course, some samples that have
been naturally returned to Earth - the martian meteorites, of which we now have thirteen.
These meteorites are all igneous rocks, and they have already yielded fundamental
information about Mars, e.g., that the planet underwent global differentiation at the end of
accretion, and some of the near-surface rocks have suffered alteration by groundwater. The
meteorites have also provided tantalizing suggestions that life could have started on the
planet as early as 3.9 billion years ago (McKay et al., 1996). Our goal with sample-return
missions is not only to supplement our suite of igneous rocks, but to acquire samples of
materials such as soils, sediments, and hydrothermally altered rocks, which are more likely to
yield information on climate, biology, and geology than the igneous rocks alone, and which
are not represented among the martian meteorites.
The advantages of having samples available for analysis here on Earth, as opposed to
being dependent on in-situ analyses, are enormous (Gooding et al., 1989; Jones and Treiman,
1998). The accuracy and precision possible in terrestrial labs is usually orders of magnitude
better than is possible with in-situ analyses. Determination of oxygen isotopes, for example,
is a thousand times more precise in terrestrial labs than has so far been possible at Mars. The
oxygen isotopes determined in martian meteorites show that there is water from at least two
sources in the meteorites. This water includes juvenile water with the same isotopic
composition as the rocks and water that have been in the atmosphere and have been exposed
to fractionating processes. This conclusion, which is important for understanding how the
atmosphere has evolved, could not have been reached with the low precisions of in-situ
analyses.
In addition, many techniques, such as those required for age dating, are so complex
that they strain the capabilities of terrestrial laboratories; they are simply too complex to be
packaged and sent to another planet. Other instruments may be relatively simple, but sample
preparationis difficult, as for example preparation of thin sections for optical microscopy or
making thin/film casts for transmission electron microscopy.
Other disadvantages of in-situ analyses are that they are necessarily restricted to
small predetermined sets and that the instruments tend to be chosen, not necessarily by the
importance of the data they produce, but by our ability to compress the instruments into
small masses and volumes for spaceflight and by their ability to accept simply prepared
samples. Thus, the alpha proton x-ray spectrometer (APXS) instrument, which determines
major element composition, is planned to be flown on several Mars lander missions because it
is small, simple, and requires no sample preparation. However, despite the widely
acknowledged desirability of getting age dates on martian rocks, there are no plans to send
instruments to do age dating. The instruments required are too complex, and the sample
preparation is too elaborate. The choice of what information to be obtained is thus partly
controlled by instrument complexity, not by the desirability of the data.
With samples here on Earth, the entire analytical capability of the science
community can be used, and hundreds of sophisticated analytical techniques can be applied to
the samples. Moreover, the analytical strategy can shift in response to what is found in the
samples, or new techniques can be developed, if needed. Many of the techniques currently
being used to analyze lunar samples, for example, were not in existence when the samples
were initially returned. Finally, work can continue on the samples as ideas mature and new
techniques become available. Lunar samples are still undergoing analyses and yielding new
results 30 years after they were collected.
The experience with the martian meteorite ALH84001 is instructive. More than
100 metric tons of instruments and laboratory equipment have been used in analyzing
ALH84001. In contrast, we can typically expect no more than a few tens of kilograms for
instruments on a lander mission to Mars.
1.3 NRC Findings and Recommendations
Given the strong desire for sample-return, the NRC Task Group on Issues in Sample
Return (TGISR) (National Research Council, 1997) was asked by NASA to assess the
potential of the samples for negative impacts on the Earth's biosphere and to make
recommendations as to what steps should be taken to mitigate those possible effects. The
task group concluded that the potential for large-scale effects from martian samples, either
through pathogenesis or ecological disruption, is extremely small, although it cannot be
demonstrated to be zero. Several observations support this conclusion. First, the chances of
any viable organisms being in the sample are low. As already indicated, the lack of liquid
water, the radiation environment, and the presence of oxidants in the soil render the surface
very hostile. It is conceivable that some form of microbial life could have started on early
Mars, or been introduced from Earth by meteorites, and survived to the present day in
protected niches well below the surface. Impacts could have brought the putative microbes to
the surface within rocks. But most rocks at the martian surface are likely to be hundreds of
millions of years old, and overcoming the radiation damage accumulated over such long
periods is unlikely. Microbes could also be introduced onto the surface through volcanic
vents and incorporated into the soil, but survival again is extremely unlikely in view of the
radiation, the oxidants, and the likely long residence times in the soil.
Second, even if there were viable organisms in the samples, the potential for
pathogenic effects is small. Pathogenesis can be divided into two fundamental types: toxic
and infectious, both of which are potential concerns in screening returned samples.
Generally, toxic effects of microorganisms are attributable to cell components or metabolic
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productsthat incidentallydamageotherorganisms.Infectiousagentshavethecapacityto
multiply in or onthehostandcausedamage.Thecapacityof a microbeto infecta host
usuallyinvolvesan intimateinteractionbetweenthepathogenandthehost. Infectionoften
dependsonhighlyspecificinteractionsbetweencell surfacesof thehostandpathogen,andit
mustovercomethe defensesthat haveevolvedin potentialhosts. Thechancesthat invasive
propertieswouldhaveevolvedin putativemartianmicrobesin theabsenceof evolutionary
selectionpressurearesmall. However,asnotedin a subsequentNRCreportonsample-return
from solarsystembodies(NRC, 1998),becausethereareexamplesof opportunistic
pathogensfrom terrestrialandaquaticenvironmentsthathavenotco-evolvedwith their
host,therisk is notzero.
Third, the NRC study on Mars sample-return (1996) noted that it is unlikely that
putative martian organism would cause any widespread ecological disruption. They would
likely be functionally similar to some terrestrial organisms and utilize nutrients that
terrestrial organisms already consume efficiently. Moreover, it is unlikely that the martian
organism could out-compete Earth's organisms for nutrients since Earth's microorganisms
are optimally adapted to the environments as a result of millions of years of intense
competition. Laboratory microbes that have been engineered to utilize particular substances
at an accelerated rate usually fail in the field because they cannot compete with well-adapted
microorganisms that already exist there (Fry and Day, 1992). However, as noted in the NRC
small bodies sample-return report (1998), currently there is very little information on the
effects of introduced microorganisms on established microbial communities or on spatial or
temporal variations in natural microbial environments on Earth.
Fourth, martian meteorites continually bombard the Earth, and they have caused no
known adverse effects. Approximately 30,000 meteorites larger than 100 grams reach the
Earth every year (Gladman, 1997; Halliday et al., 1989). Among all known meteorites, the
ratio of martian to nonmartian is 5 x 10-4. However, martian meteorites are more difficult
to recognize than most other meteorites. A better indication of the true ratio may be the
ratio among falls, which is approximately 10-2. If these two figures are taken as limits, then
15 to 300 martian meteorites hit the Earth every year. Although most martian meteorites
spend millions of years in space where they could be sterilized, a small fraction reach Earth
within thousands of years or even a few years (Gladman et ai., 1997) and would not be
sterilized. Since many are only minimally shocked on leaving the Mars surface, and only the
outer few millimeters are heated on Earth entry, it appears likely that the Earth commonly
receives unsterilized Mars samples. On the other hand the meteorites may not be
representative of the materials available to be sampled at the martian surface. There are, for
example, no soils or sediments among the martian meteorites.
For these reasons, the NRC Task Group (NRC, 1997) came to the following
conclusion, with which we concur:
The possibility of life on Mars cannot be excluded on the basis of our
understanding of the martian environment. Nevertheless, the potential for
including a living entity in a sample-returned from Mars is judged to be low,
especially if the sample is returned from a site that has not been specifically
targeted as a possible oasis. The potential for returning an organism that
could grow and multiply in the terrestrial environment is lower still. If an
organism were returned that could survive on Earth, the potential for large-
scale ecological or pathogenic effects still would be low. Any organism that
could survive in Earth's environment would meet intense competition from
well-adapted terrestrial organisms that occupy their habitats to the limits of
available resources. It is especially unlikely that putative martian organisms
could be agents of infectious disease. Such a capability requires specific
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adaptations,for whichth'ereisno selectionpressureon Mars,to overcome
the elaboratedefensesagainstinvasionpossessedby terrestrialorganisms.
Therearelargeuncertaintiesassociatedwith theseassessments,however,and
the riskof potentiallyharmfuleffectsis notzero.
In light of theabovereasoning,theNRCTaskGroupmadethefollowingfindingsand
recommendations.
1.3.1 NRC Findings
1.3.1. I Although current evidence suggests that the surface of Mars is inimical to life
as we know it, there remain plausible scenarios for extant microbial life on Mars - for
instance in possible hydrothermal oases or in subsurface regions.
1.3.1.2 Contamination of Earth by putative microorganisms is unlikely to pose a risk
of significant ecological impact or other significant harmful effects. The risk is not zero,
however.
1.3.1.3 Uncertainties with regard to the possibility of extant martian life can be
reduced through a program of research and exploration that might include data acquisition
from orbital platforms, robotic exploration of the surface of Mars, the study of martian
meteorites, the study of Mars-like or other extreme environments on Earth, and the study of
returned samples. However, each returned sample should be assumed to contain viable
exogenous biological entities until proven otherwise.
1.3.2 NRC Recommendations
1.3.2.1 Samples returned from Mars by spacecraft should be contained and treated as
potentially hazardous unless proven otherwise. No uncontained materials, including
spacecraft surfaces that have been exposed to the martian environment, should be returned to
Earth unless sterilized.
1.3.2.2 If sample containment cannot be verified en route to Earth, the sample, and
any spacecraft components that may have been exposed to the sample, should either be
sterilized in space or not returned to Earth.
1.3.2.3 Integrity of containment should be maintained through re-entry of the
spacecraft and transfer of the sample to an appropriate receiving facility.
1.3.2.4 Controlled distribution of unsterilized materials returned from Mars should
occur only if rigorous analyses determine that the materials do not contain a biological
hazard. If any portion of the sample is removed from containment prior to completion of
these analyses, it should first be sterilized.
1.3.2.5 The planetary protection measures adopted for the first Mars sample-return
mission should not be relaxed for subsequent missions without thorough scientific review and
concurrence by an appropriate independent body.
1.3.2.6 A research facility for receiving, containing, and processing returned samples
should be established as soon as possible once serious planning for a Mars sample-return
mission has begun. At a minimum, the facility should be operational at least 2 years prior to
launch. The facility should be staffed by a multidisciplinary team of scientists responsible for
the development and validation of procedures for detection, preliminary characterization,
and containment of organisms (living, dead, or fossil) in returned samples, and for sample
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sterilization.An advisorypanelof scientistshouldbeconstitutedandgivenoversight
responsibilityfor thefacility.
1.3.2.7 A panelof experts,includingrepresentativesof relevantgovernmentaland
scientificbodies,shouldbeestablishedassoonaspossible,onceseriousplanningfor aMars
sample-returnmissionhasbegun,to coordinateregulatoryresponsibilitiesandto advise
NASA on the implementationof planetaryprotectionmeasuresfor sample-returnmissions.
Thepanelshouldbe in placeat least1yearpriorto theestablishmentof thesample
receivingfacility (at least3 yearspriorto launch)
1.3.2.8An administrativestructureshouldbeestablishedwithinNASAto verify and
certify adherenceto planetaryprotectionrequirementsat eachcritical stageof a sample-
returnmission,includinglaunch,re-entry,andsampledistribution.
1.3.2.9 Throughoutanysample-returnprogram,thepublic shouldbeopenly
informedof plans,activities,results,andassociatedissues.
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2 OVERVIEW
The Sample-return System can be viewed as all the elements involved in acquiring
samples, delivering them to Earth, and making them available to the science community for
analysis. The system has 3 primary goals:
1. To return martian samples to Earth as unaltered and free of terrestrial
contamination as is possible
2. To prevent uncontrolled introduction of martian materials into the terrestrial
environment, whether in the sample capsule or on other spacecraft components.
3. To maximize science return from the samples.
Requirements for handling Mars samples are driven by two distinctly
different and important emphases: on the one hand, traditional biosafety and
planetary protection concerns; and on the other, sample protection and science
considerations. The former focuses on keeping materials in, while the latter
strives to keep contaminants out. Developing specific containment guidelines for
handling extraterrestrial samples will require accommodation of these two needs. It will be a
major task to translate established Center for Disease Control National Institutes of Health
(CDC-NIH) biocontainment guidelines for known biological agents into laboratory designs,
equipment designs, and handling protocols appropriate for operations both in space and on
Earth. In addition, the needs of planetary scientists to minimize terrestrial contamination
and maintain samples in a pristine and unaltered state down to the isotopic composition level
will be added. The end-to-end design of the system for handling the samples will initially
need to be under strict containment consistent with biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) as defined by
CDC-NIH biocontainment guidelines. At the same time it must incorporate proven
techniques for meeting cleanliness criteria of the existing extraterrestrial materials facility at
Johnson Space Center (JSC, Houston, TX). In short, it must be compatible with the best
available practices for meeting both biosafety and planetary science needs. The steps to be
taken to achieve these challenging goals are summarized below.
2.1 Sample Preservation and Contamination Control
Terrestrial contamination of the samples should be minimized by application of
appropriate cleanliness standards to different spacecraft components, according to how likely
contaminants could be transferred to the samples. Different standards pertain to different
potential contaminants such as live cells, dead cells, biogenic molecules, and carbon
compounds. All components that come in direct contact with the samples should be both
sterilized and cleaned to significantly higher levels than Viking (see Section 4). Since perfect
cleanliness cannot be achieved, assays should be made of various potential contaminants, and
markers should be used where appropriate (e.g., in lubricants). However such markers should
only be used to follow adventitious contaminants and should not be deliberately introduced
into the samples, such as by adding tracers to drill bits. To avoid alteration of the sample en
route to the Earth, samples should be stored under pressure and temperature conditions
similar to those at the surface of Mars, and should not be exposed to vibrations that would
destroy the physical integrity of the samples. To prevent terrestrial contamination the
sample capsule should be opened in a facility that matches or exceeds the
cleanliness criteria of the existing extraterrestrial materials facility at JSC. This
facility must also provide the equivalent containment of a BSL-4 facility, as
discussed below. As far as we know, such a facility does not yet exist.
2.2 Prevention of Uncontrolled Introduction of Martian Materials Into the
Terrestrial Environment
The samples must be returned to the Earth in such a way that minimizes the
probability of inadvertent introduction of unsterilized martian materials into the Earth's
biosphere. This is to be accomplished by enclosing the samples within a canister that is
sealed before leaving the martian surface and which is surrounded by additional seals and High
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters, or their equivalents. (These filters are at least
99.97 percent efficient for particles 0.3 microns and larger.) Transfer of the canister to the
Earth return vehicle is to be done in such a way that no martian materials are transferred to
the Earth Return Vehicle except those contained within the sample canister itself. Upon
return to the Earth the sample canister must be opened in a facility with the equivalent of
BSL-4 containment. Unsterilized samples can be removed from containment only if and
when it has been demonstrated that the samples do not contain a biological hazard. In the
interim, only sterilized samples are to be distributed to the science community for analysis.
2.3 Hazard Assessment
Direct hazard assessment experiments, involving the exposure of martian materials
to different biological entities, are to be done on nonsterilized samples in the containment
facility soon after receipt of the samples. Geochemical characterization of the samples and
life-detection experiments, which have the potential for providing additional insights with
respect to the hazard potential of the samples, should be conducted in parallel with the hazard
assessment experiments. Results from early life-detection experiments on unsterilized
samples and from geochemical characterization of sterilized samples, together with the
results from the biohazard assessment tests, will indicate whether the unsterilized samples can
be distributed to the science community or whether further, more definitive, hazard
assessment tests are needed.
2.4 Maximize Science Return
A guiding principle behind our recommendations on science analysis is that, as far as
is possible, sample analysis should be done in a distributed manner by the science
community at large through the normal NASA Research Announcement (NRA)
and peer review process, and not at a central research facility. Much of the early
geochemical analysis should be done on a subset of the samples that have been sterilized in
such a way as to preserve most of the information inherent in the samples.
A Preliminary Examination Team (PET) will have the responsibility for performing
those analyses that are necessary in order to intelligently allocate and distribute the sterilized
subsamples to the science community, and those samples that must be analyzed at the facility
because of time or containment requirements. Most of the early science analysis should be
done on distributed sterilized samples, and an international panel of scientists should evaluate
proposals and allocate samples in light of the findings of the PET. Until the samples are
found to be harmless, the bulk of the samples would remain preserved behind a biobarrier. At
this stage some preliminary life-detection experiments may be conducted behind the
biobarrier at the receiving facility. The design of definitive life detection experiments will
likely depend on the results from analyses done on the sterilized samples. Armed with this
knowledge, additional proposals for definitive life detection experiments could then be
evaluated and conducted on unsterilized samples. Until the samples are proven to be
harmless, analyses on unsterilized samples must be done behind a biobarrier, although not
necessarily at the sample receiving facility. We do not rule out transport of contained
samples to other facilities, provided they have the appropriate containment and controls.
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2.5 Alternative Approaches Considered and Rejected
Two alternatives to the direct return of unsterilized sample were considered. The
first is to return the samples to the International Space Station (ISS) for initial hazard
assessment. The second is to sterilize the samples at Mars before returning them to Earth.
Both these alternatives were rejected for the reasons given below.
2.5.1 Return Samples to Space Station
Return to the Space Station (DeVincenzi and Bagby, 1981) might seem like an
obvious solution to sample containment, and prevention of any uncontrolled release of
martian materials on Earth. However, closer examination indicates that this approach is not
only impractical, but may be riskier than direct return of samples to Earth for the following
reasons:
. The Space Station is in low Earth orbit (LEO). To rendezvous with it, the sample
canister would have to be placed in LEO. Injection into the appropriate orbit
could be done either propulsively or by aerobraking using the Earth's atmosphere.
In either case failure could result in uncontrolled entry into the Earth's
atmosphere. Similarly, loss of control of the Earth return vehicle while in LEO
could result in decay of the orbit and eventually uncontrolled entry. In contrast,
the direct return sample canister can be specifically designed to safely enter the
Earth's atmosphere and land at a pre-designated target.
. Even if the sample were safely delivered to the ISS, failure of the ISS itself could
result in abandonment by the crew in the Crew Return Vehicle or Shuttle, followed
by orbit decay of the ISS and a Skylab-like re-entry.
. The facilities and personnel available in the ISS to do the necessary hazard
assessment and life detection experiments would be far inferior to those available
on the ground, and the assessments would be correspondingly more uncertain.
. Testing for hazards on the ISS would be done in a microgravity environment.
Failure to detect hazards might result from failure of the putative organisms in
the samples to multiply in this environment. In addition, ambiguities could arise
because of inability to discriminate harmful effects of the samples on test
materials from harmful effects of the microgravity environment. Our concern is
with potential harmful effects of the samples in the terrestrial environment, and
this is where the testing should be done.
. Severe restrictions on power, space, and instrumentation, as well as the difficulty
of designing containment and laboratory facilities to operate in a microgravity
environment, present a variety of poorly understood problems. The costs of
converting the ISS into an appropriately equipped sample receiving facility are
likely to be so large as to be impractical. As a consequence, if return to the ISS
were a requirement, there likely would be no sample-return. In contrast, facilities
exist on Earth that routinely handle hazardous biological materials. It is safer to
bring the samples to Earth where facilities appropriate to the unique needs of
sample-return can be built.
6. Use of the ISS for evaluating returned Mars samples would usurp other uses of the
facility, which is already over-subscribed.
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. Sickness among the astronauts would create several dilemmas, aggravated by the
limited medical facilities on ISS, including whether the samples caused the
sickness, what countermeasures should be taken, and what the fate of the
astronauts should be.
2.5.2 Return Only Sterilized Samples
The following considerations led the panel to reject sterilizing the samples at Mars,
or on the way back to the Earth, the main reason being the difficulty of guaranteeing
sterilization without destroying much of information inherent in the samples.
. As discussed in Section 1.3, the chances that there are living organisms in the
sample are very low. This is particularly true for samples collected at the surface
and not specifically targeted to more favorable environments, such as active
hydrothermal areas, if they exist. Even if the samples contain living organisms,
the chances that they could survive on Earth and have large-scale pathogenic or
ecological effects are low.
. We do not know how best to sterilize martian materials at Mars or in the space
environment, and particularly how to guarantee that sterilization has actually
been achieved.
We are recommending that unsterilized samples be returned to Earth. Only
sterilized samples will be distributed to the science community until the samples
have been demonstrated to be harmless. Gamma-ray radiation will likely be the
method of sterilization since megadoses can be given to the sample without
seriously jeopardizing the scientific value of the samples. However, it may not be
possible to use this technique at Mars because, to guarantee sterilization, the
samples must be exposed to more than 30 Mrad of radiation (Allen, 1999). This
would require the launching of a large amount of some radioactive material.
Chemical sterilization is ruled out because of the unacceptable levels of chemical
alteration that the samples would sustain. If we were to sterilize samples at Mars,
it would almost certainly have to be heat sterilization. The temperature required
for sterilization depends on the time that the temperature is maintained.
Preliminary experiments on soils by Hochstein et al. (1974) showed that
sterilization was achieved with 200°C for 24 hours but not with 125°C for 120
hours or with 150°C for 24 hours. Similar experiments by Labeda et al. (1975)
showed that soils were sterilized at 200°C for 24 hours but not with 180°C at 30
hours. If we assume that the putative martian microbes have characteristics
similar to terrestrial microbes, then these and other experiments (see Appendix
A) suggest that conditions similar to 200°C for 24 hours, or more severe, will
likely be required to have a high probability that the martian soils and rocks are
sterilized.
3. Heat sterilization will destroy much of the information inherent in the samples.
The samples are expected to contain three types of information: geologic,
climatologic, and biologic. Geologic information on primary igneous processes
would be the least affected by heat sterilization because the information is stored
mostly in high temperature minerals, which would be largely unaffected by being
exposed to sterilization temperatures. It could be argued, however, that we
already have samples of primary igneous rocks in the martian meteorites so that
this aspect of the samples may be of lesser interest than other aspects.
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Primaryigneousrocksmaybealteredas a result of weathering at the surface or
circulation of groundwater. If they are altered as a result of weathering at the
surface, the alteration products retain information about the surface conditions
under which weathering occurred. If they are altered as a result of groundwater
circulation, the alteration products retain information on the subsurface
conditions at the time of alteration. In either case, the products are of
considerable interest for their climatic implications and for implications that they
might have for conditions under which life may have existed or under which pre-
biotic evolution might have occurred. The most heated discussions of ALH84001
have, for example, been not about the primary mineralogy, but about the
conditions under which secondary alteration occurred. Alteration products will be
low temperature minerals such as clays, zeolites, sulfides, carbonates, halides, and
iron oxides and hydroxides. All are susceptible to irreversible alteration at or near
sterilization temperatures. In addition, isotopic exchange reactions become
significant for clay minerals and related minerals at temperatures above 100°C.
Isotopes, particularly oxygen and hydrogen, are important for understanding the
physical conditions under which mineral deposition took place, for deciphering
how the atmosphere evolved, and for gauging the extent to which atmospheric
species interchanged with the surface. (For a detailed assessment of the
mineralogical effects of heating martian samples to sterilization temperatures see
Gooding, 1990, pp. 16-18.) A major casualty of sterilization is, thus, likely to be
our ability to determine the conditions under which alteration occurred.
Clearly, characterization of any organics within the returned samples is central to
the search for past or present life. Considerable effort is to be made to obtain
drill cores from rocks in order to obtain samples that are minimally affected by
the oxidizing conditions right at the surface. Preservation of organics will be
strongly influenced by conditions used for sterilization (e.g., times of exposure to
various temperatures), so the sterilization regime chosen will have a major impact
on the mission success. Preliminary experiments on terrestrial soils indicate
significant losses of total amino nitrogen (40%) with 24 hours at 200°C and
almost complete loss (80-90%) at 275°C. Selective recemization occurred at
150°C and was almost complete at 275°C. Heating of the Murchison meteorite
to 150, 200, and 275°C resulted in alteration of the amino acid content in all
cases, and at 275°C alteration was so severe as to leave little useful chemical
information (Hochstein et al., 1974).
Soils will be particularly sensitive to alteration by heating. They are likely to be
predominantly weathering products that formed during some early era when
surface conditions were more favorable to weathering (and life) than present
conditions. Information on these earlier conditions may therefore be present in
the soils. Because they are probably composed mainly of low-temperature silicate
minerals, salts, and possibly ices, they would be especially vulnerable to alteration
by heating as discussed above. In addition, there are trace quantities of an
oxidant. We know from the Viking biology experiments (Klein, 1978) that the
activity of the oxidant declines irreversibly over the 50-125°C temperature
range, so that sterilization at temperatures above 125°C would effectively rule out
identification of the oxidant. Finally the experiments of Hochstein et al. (1974)
suggested that heating of soils to 150°C for 24 hours caused significant
morphological changes and formation of artifacts that might be misidentified as
biologic in origin.
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Thus,whileheatsterilizationwouldhavea minimaleffecton the petrologic value
of the samples, their value as indicators of near-surface conditions on the planet
in the past and of possible biologic activity would be severely jeopardized.
. Potential hazards in the samples cannot be evaluated without non-sterilized
samples here on Earth, yet must be settled before human exploration is
undertaken.
. Engineering solutions exist whereby completely contained samples can be
returned to Earth with a very high probability that containment will not be
violated.
. Even if samples were sterilized on Mars, we would still have to take the
appropriate precautions to prevent any uncontrolled release when they are
returned to Earth and we would still have to conduct biohazard assessment
experiments in a containment before they could be distributed
In summary, sterilization at Mars was rejected as an option because we do
not know how to guarantee sterilization at Mars without destroying the scientific
value of the samples, nor do we know how to verify that sterilization has been
achieved. Search for past or present life and evaluation of former climatic
conditions under which life may have started are prime objectives of the Mars
exploration program, yet these objectives are placed most in jeopardy by
sterilizing the samples prior to Earth return. If non-sterilized samples are returned to
Earth, we can use radiation techniques, that minimize damage to the samples, on some subset
distributed to the science community, while retaining a pristine sample for determination of
those properties affected by the sterilization procedures. Moreover, we can do far more
comprehensive testing on the samples here on Earth than we can at Mars in order to assess
any potential harmful effects.
2.6 Risks of Returning Unsterilized Samples
The panel adopted the strategy of returning contained, unsterilized samples directly
to Earth because (1) the risks that the samples contain anything harmful is very low, (2)
containment can be engineered so that the probability of breaching containment is low, and
(3) the alternatives have major drawbacks, as just described. It is almost impossible to put
numerical values on the risks. For the samples to present a serious threat, they must contain
a viable organism that has the following characteristics:
I. Be able to reproduce.
2. Survive acquisition, containment, and return to Earth.
3. Be released because of containment failure.
4. Be transported after release, such as by air currents or biological carriers.
5. Survive the chemical and physical conditions it encounters on the way to a
favorable environment.
6. Serendipitously encounter a favorable physical environment or biological host.
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7. Survivethehost'sdefensesor theterrestrialbiologicalcompetitionin a favorable
physicalenvironment.
8. Thriveandmultiply to produceanobservable,deleteriouseffect.
9. Beresistanto eradicationcountermeasuresavailablein theyear2008.
The panel could see little basis for assigning numerical probabilities to the above items,
except for item 3 (over which we have some control), but for the reasons outlined in section
1.3, the probabilities are likely to be small. The largest uncertainty is whether the samples
contain any viable martian organisms. However, even if viable martian organisms are
present, the chances of them being pathogenic or causing widespread ecological disruption are
very small, as was concluded by the NRC Task Group (National Research Council, 1997), and
discussed in section 1.3 above.
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3 SAMPLE ACQUISITION
3.1 Overview
At the time of writing this document in early 1999, plans for acquiring martian
samples were undergoing review. The following is a brief description of the plan at that time
(Figure 3-1). Two sample acquisition missions were planned, one to be launched in 2003 and
a second to be launched in 2005. Each of these missions was to include a rover that would
collect samples in a cache and deliver the cache to a canister, loaded onto a Mini-MAV (Mini
Mars Ascent Vehicle) that would deliver the samples to orbit around Mars. The 2005 mission
would also include an ERV (Earth Return Vehicle) that would rendezvous with one or both of
the sample canisters in orbit around Mars and return them to Earth. The rendezvous with the
sample canisters is planned to take place early in 2007. The ERV would leave Mars orbit
with the samples in mid-2007 and deliver samples to Earth a year later, in mid-2008.
The 2003 and 2005 rovers are to be delivered to the martian surface on a lander. On
each mission the rover will leave the lander and travel on several loops tens of meters away
from the lander, and deliver samples to the lander after completing each loop. The first loop
will be short; subsequent loops will be of increasing size and complexity. The rover acquires
samples by means of a mini-corer, a device that can acquire rock cores 7 mm in diameter, as
long as 2.5 cm, and from depths as great as 5 cm within a rock. It also has provision for
acquiring a small number of soil samples. Sample collection will be supported by remote
sensing instruments on the lander and by analytical instruments on the rover. The cores are
to be stored in pigeon holes within a sample cache on the rover. The cache is transferred to
the mini-MAV on the lander when the rover has finished its looping traverse. In addition,
the lander is planned to have an ann with a scoop to collect a contingency soil sample. The
possibility of including a drill and coring device on the lander was also being explored. The
number of rock and soil samples to be collected is not yet determined but is expected to be
close to 30 with each mission. The total sample mass is expected to be in the 300- to
1000-g range.
The following materials, in no particular order, are of most interest for the primary
goals of searching for evidence of past and present life and determining the climatologic and
geologic histories of the planet:
(1) Unweathered igneous rocks of different types and ages that span the geologic
history of the planet
(2) Breccias from large impact basins
(3) Water-lain sediments, preferably those deposited in low energy environments
such as lakes
(4) Loose surface material including soil profiles
(5) Salts (carbonates, nitrates, etc.) and water-ice
(6) Atmosphere
(7) Hydrothermal deposits
All these materials are unlikely to be found at a single site so multiple sample-return
missions are required.
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3.2 Sample Types
3.2.1 Rock Cores
By the time that MSHARP was convened, the basic strategy of relying mainly on the
minicorer for acquiring samples had been adopted. The rationale for using a minicorer is
sound. Rocks on the surface of Mars are expected to have a surface weathering rind. We
know that the soil is oxidizing, but we do not know how deeply the oxidizing conditions
penetrate into rocks. Since weathering can destroy primary rock minerals, structures, and
organics that might, for example, contain evidence of past life or past conditions, it is highly
desirable to get below the weathering rind. The minicorer will likely penetrate the
weathering rind and provide access to the unaltered rocks beneath. The only practical
sampling alternative is to collect naturally occurring pebbles or rock chips. However, such
small chips are much more likely than rocks and boulders to be weathered throughout. Many
of the small pieces at the Viking and Pathfinder landing sites have spectral properties similar
to the soil and were probably clods of soil rather than rocks. Taking cores from larger
boulders or outcrops also allows the broader geologic context of the samples to be
documented. In addition, coring has the practical advantage of providing uniformly shaped
samples for packaging. For all these reasons MSHARP endorses the current plan for
acquisition of rock cores.
The depth of the weathering rind in the rocks could significantly affect the sampling
strategy. The rock corer has the capability of extracting two 2.5-cm-long cores from a
5-cm-deep hole. In the most likely event that the weathering rind is only millimeters thick,
there is little justification for getting duplicate cores at a single location. We recognize that
the Curation and Analysis Planning Team for Extraterrestrial Materials (CAPTEM) has
advocated getting two 2.5 cm cores at each sample location and placing both in the same
pigeon hole in the sample cache (Appendix B). This was advocated partly to avoid cross-
contamination between samples and partly to ensure getting below the weathering rind. We,
however, conclude that time and resources may be better spent getting a sample from another
rock and adding to the sample variety, rather than getting duplicate samples from the same
rock. The total sample mass is very limited and should not normally be consumed in getting
duplicate samples of the same rock. Similarly, the number of samples is likely to be limited
by the time available to the rover to collect samples, and that time should not normally be
consumed in acquiring duplicate samples. The only circumstance that we believe would justify
getting two samples from the same borehole is the presence of a weathering rind that is
centimeters thick. It may then be necessary to get duplicate cores to get below it. Such an
assessment will have to be made during the mission on the basis of observations made on
newly acquired cores by the rover instruments. We do not think that cross-contamination is
enough of a concern to give up getting different samples in order to get duplicate samples.
3.2.2 Contingency Sample
The lander must acquire a contingency sample, consisting of a scoop of the local soil.
This sample would serve two purposes. The first is contingency in the event that the rover is
unable to acquire samples and deliver them to the lander. We regard deployment of the
rover, moving around the surface, acquisition of rock cores, and transfer of samples from
rover the lander all as risky operations. A simple backup plan is needed. Thus, one of the
first things that a lander should do on reaching the surface of Mars is load a contingency soil
sample in the Mini-MAV.
The contingency sample could also serve a science purpose. The loose material at
the surface has intrinsic interest. We do not know how it formed. It may be mostly
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weathered material that formed at some time early in Mars history when weathering rates
were higher, but other components, such as volcanic debris, are also likely to be present. The
presence of duricrust at the Viking and Pathfinder landing sites indicates that the material has
undergone further changes in place. It may also contain small, unweathered chips of rock not
present in the large boulders and bedrock. Thus, a scoop of the local soil has a science value
in addition to providing a backup to the minicorer.
MSHARP, therefore, strongly recommends that a contingency sample be
collected by the lander as a contingency against rover failure and to ensure an
adequate sample of the local soil. Should core samples (including soils) be successfully
acquired, then a decision could be made as to whether or not the contingency sample should
be returned.
3.2.3 Soil Samples
The soil is expected to vary from place to place. It may be fractionated by the wind
or have undergone different levels of duricrust development. Several samples of soil should,
therefore, be collected by the rover in addition to the soil sample collected by the lander. The
original Athena proposal for acquisition of samples from a Mars rover (Squyres, 1996)
outlined a way of obtaining several soil samples by placing a cylindrical cup within the
minicorer and drilling it into the soil to retrieve a sample. The filled cup is then stored in the
sample container in the same way as the rock cores. We support the objective of
acquiring multiple soil samples.
3.2.4 Atmosphere Sample
A sample of the atmosphere is required. The martian atmosphere enclosed in the
headspace within the sample canister may satisfy this requirement. The canister must,
therefore, be designed so that the atmospheric gases can be extracted when the canister is
opened in the sample receiving facility (SRF) on Earth.
3.3 Sampling Strategy
The number of samples collected at each sample site will likely be limited to less than
30 by rover/lander lifetimes and by the time it takes to move around the surface and do the
drilling to acquire the samples. Every effort should be made to maximize the variety of
samples taken and their total mass. The distribution of rocks at a landing site is likely to be
such that one rock type dominates. The second most abundant rock is likely to be much
more abundant than the third most abundant, and so forth. A random sampling would likely
result in a limited variety or no variety of rock types. Remote sensing data from the rover,
lander, and orbiters must, therefore, be used to detect differences in the accessible rocks and
to act as a sampling guide so that as many of the different types of rocks present at a site are
collected as is practical. Obtaining maximum variety is crucial, irrespective of what we might
think causes the variety. For instance, the martian Antarctica meteorite (ALH84001) has
given the best hints of life so far in a martian sample, yet a pyroxenite would not normally
be judged the best place to look for evidence of life.
Elaborate documentation of samples with in-situ analyses, while desirable, particularly
to confirm if a rock potentially available for sampling is different from any previously
samples, should not be done at the expense of acquiring additional samples. (Fortunately,
most of the in-situ analyses desirable to document the samples can be done at night when
other operations are not possible, so that documentation can be done with minimal impact
on sample acquisition). A possible exception to the general conclusion that in-situ
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documentationshouldnotbedoneat theexpenseof gettingmoresamplesis determiningthe
thicknessof theweatheringrind earlyin thesamplingphase,asindicatedin Section3.2.1.
3.3.1 Sample Separation
We do not consider cross-contamination between samples to be a major concern. All
the rock samples will inevitably be contaminated with soil. It is simply impractical to keep
all the various components that will come into contact with the samples free from martian
dust, which is present not only on the ground, but also in the atmosphere. Cross-
contamination between rocks is similarly of minor concern. We can see little penalty in
putting two different rock samples in the same pigeonhole in the sample container. We
note, however, that CAPTEM advocates taking measures to prevent cross-contamination
(Appendix B).
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4 PREVENTION OF SAMPLE CONTAMINATION
4.1 Overview
The collection and return of samples includes several transfers, any one of which
might cause contamination (Figure 4-1).
We are specifically concerned with three forms of contamination:
(1) Forward contamination of Mars by terrestrial organisms and by terrestrial organic
matter associated with intact cells or cell.
(2) Contamination of samples with any terrestrial materials, both organic and
inorganic.
(3) Back contamination, or the introduction of extraterrestrial materials into the
terrestrial environment.
Back contamination, which is of the greatest public concern for sample-return
missions, is controlled by containment and handling protocols and is dealt with in Sections 5
and 6. This section deals with items (1) and (2) above, which are primarily scientific
concerns.
Forward contamination of Mars was of concern to the committee only insofar as it
affected the integrity of the returned samples (and supporting in-situ observations).
Planetary protection policies for Mars missions have been revised since the time of the
Viking missions (National Research Council, 1992). Cleanliness and sterilization
requirements depend on the classification of the mission. We assume that components that
land on the martian surface but do not return to Earth (rover, lander) fall under category IVa
for planetary protection purposes (DeVincenzi et al., 1996). That is, they are landers
without life detection experiments. For components that are returned to the Earth, the
greater concern is not forward contamination of Mars but back contamination, for which
there are the more stringent Category V requirements, i.e., sterilization of all spacecraft
components returned to Earth that have been in contact with martian materials, and
containment of the samples (National Research Council, 1997). We are also advocating
cleanliness and sterilization requirements more stringent than those needed for Class IVa for
some hardware that does not return to Earth, because of their potential for contaminating
the samples.
Terrestrial contamination of the samples is of considerable concern. Potential
contaminants include living organisms, dead organisms, cell debris, organic molecules, and
inorganic compounds. They could result during the mission from interchange between
various spacecraft components and the samples, or subsequent to the mission during sample
handling. Round-trip transport of viable organisms is a possibility. Bacterial spores may have
survived two and a half years exposure to the lunar environment on the Surveyor 3 lander
before being returned to the Earth by the Apollo 12 mission (Mitchell and Ellis, 1972).
Some viable seeds and spores were also found on materials returned from the Long Duration
Exposure Facility (LDEF) satellite aider several years in space (NASA, 1991; Horneck,
Bucker, and Reitz, 1991)
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Concern over terrestrial contamination of the samples arises not because
such contaminants present a threat, but because they undermine our ability to
interpret data from the samples. They will not only place the validity of the
scientific results from the samples in jeopardy, but also affect how long they are
kept under strict biocontainment. False positives from the hazard analysis or life
detection tests (Sections 6.1.3.4 and 6.1.3.5) could indefinitely delay release of
unsterilized samples to the science community.
4.2 Approach
Because the samples will come in contact with, and be in close proximity to,
terrestrial materials on the spacecraft, some terrestrial contamination is inevitable. Ideally,
we would like to specify that there be no dead or live terrestrial organisms and no terrestrial
organic molecules in the sample chamber when it is opened in a containment facility on
Earth. But to guarantee this may not be possible, and if possible, it may be prohibitively
expensive. Moreover, the cost of failure to achieve absolute absence of contaminants is not
catastrophic. There may be some erosion of the science and some extension of the time that
unsterilized samples must remain behind a biobarrier. But failure to achieve an absolute
cleanliness standard does not present a hazard (as might failure to achieve a containment
standard).
The sensitivity of analytical instruments continues to increase with time. Identifying
certain organic molecules present at less than 1 part in 1012 will be routinely achievable when
the samples are returned in 2008. This capability places greater demands on cleanliness.
Fortunately, cleaning techniques are also evolving. Techniques such as using hydrogen
peroxide plasma or ultra pure water, for example, were not available (and not needed) when
Viking was launched in 1975. Thus more stringent contamination controls than were needed
by Viking may reasonably be anticipated.
Recognizing that some terrestrial contamination could occur, we are advocating,
that in addition to following appropriate sterilization and cleaning procedures,
that assays be made of potential contaminants, and that contaminant tracers and
'witness plates' be used to help identify contaminants.
4.3 Sterilization and Cleaning
Different cleanliness standards should apply to different spacecraft components
according to how likely they are to transmit contaminants to the samples.
4.3.1 Sterilized and Superclean Components
All components of the spacecraft that come in direct contact with the
samples must be sterilized and cleaned to significantly higher standards than the
rest of the spacecraft. These components include the minicorer, the sample cache, the
contingency sample scoop, and the interior of the sample canister. We have opted not to
quantify what is meant by "significantly higher standards", because we do not know how
difficult and costly they are to achieve. We note, however, that a Planetary Protection
Workshop held at JPL Dec 9-11, 1998, suggested that a reasonable goal for these
components, is that, in addition to being sterilized, they should be cleaned to about 10,000
times better than Viking and enclosed behind some form of bioshield on the surface of Mars
to prevent contamination from other, less stringently cleaned components. (The December
9-tl workshop is to be published; viewgraphs of the meeting are in Carr, 1998.)
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4.3.2 Other Components That Land on Mars
All components that go to the martian surface must be cleaned to at least Viking
levels of cleanliness prior to sterilization in order to satisfy planetary protection
requirements for forward contamination. For Pathfinder this was interpreted to mean less
than 300 spores/m2 and less than l0 s total spores on exposed surfaces. Pathfinder achieved
12 spores/m2 and less than 2.4 x 104 total. We believe a reasonable goal for the
components that go to the martian surface, including the rover, the lander, and the
Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV), is to achieve at least the Pathfinder cleanliness levels.
4.3.3 Earth Return Vehicle
Because the sample will be enclosed in the sample canister before it is delivered to the
Earth Return Vehicle (ERV), terrestrial contamination of the ERV is not an issue.
Contamination of the ERV with martian materials is, however, a very important issue (see
section 5.4).
4.4 Contamination Monitoring
Given that, even with our best efforts, some terrestrial contamination of the sample
could occur, several steps should be taken to aid in recognition of the contaminants.
4.4.1 Tracers
The Athena team, which is largely responsible for design of the sample acquisition
system that is to be used at Mars, advocated adding molecular tracers to drill bits to allow
subsequent assessment of the extent to which contaminants might have penetrated into the
cores (Squyres, 1996). MSHARP discussed this concept in some length and recommended
that CAPTEM look into it further. MSHARP and CAPTEM both advised against
impregnating the drill cores with a molecular tracer. (The CAPTEM advice was in two
letters included in Appendix B, the MSHARP advice is in the minutes of the Mars Sample
Handling Panel, January 9, 1998 [Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1998].)
The suggestion to add tracers to the drilling bit stemmed in part from their successful
use in looking for microorganisms deep within the Earth's crust. In these experiments,
molecular tracers, such as perfluoromethylcyclohexane and latex beads with fluorescent dyes
are added to the drilling mud. The mud is forced part way into the cores. Absence of tracers
in the interiors of the cores gives assurance that there is no contamination.
Both MSHARP and CAPTEM concluded, however, that collection of martian
samples is only loosely analogous to acquisition of deep drill cores on Earth. Contamination
of the martian sample could come from a variety of sources, not just from the drill bits.
Tracers would allow contamination from the drill bit itself to be recognized, but would be of
little help for other contaminants that might be transferred to the surfaces of the cores after
stowage. Moreover, contamination by the drill bit would be recognizable from the tantalum,
tungsten, and cobalt in the steel and abrasives that are used in fabrication of the drill bits.
The main concern about using molecular tracers on the drill bits is that the deliberate addition
of the tracers could significantly interfere with interpretation of data from the samples.
Tracer materials that contain hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen, for example, could
have significant negative effects on Earth-based analyses. The isotopes of these elements all
contain crucial information on the evolution of the atmosphere, past climates, and the
potential for life. Carbon and nitrogen are likely to be present in only minute amounts, and
deliberate addition of terrestrial carbon and nitrogen could mask the signatures that we are
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lookingfor. We, therefore, recommend that molecular tracers not be added to the
drill bits.
The above discussion does not rule out all uses of tracers. The main objection to
adding tracers to the drill bits is the deliberate addition of organic molecules to the samples
when elements in the drill bit themselves could be used as tracers. There may be
justification for use of tracers in other circumstances. Inorganic tracers might be
added to some lubricant on the rover, for example, that is unlikely to contaminate
the sample, but which, if it did, would need to be recognized. In this case
contamination is adventitious, not deliberate, and the tracer would not normally
interfere with subsequent sample analysis.
4.4.2 Witness Plates
We strongly recommend the use of witness plates for monitoring
contaminants. Some plates could be exposed to the same cleaning conditions as the rovers
and landers here on Earth, then removed as late as possible before launch. Others could be
included in the sample cache but sealed before arrival at Mars. Yet others might remain open
during sample acquisition and be sealed prior to loading in the MAV, and thus have a high
ratio of contaminant to martian material. Witness plates thus could help not only to
identify, but also to determine their source. We recognize that incorporation of witness
plates into the plan has cost and engineering implications, and we do not know what they are.
We are not, therefore, insisting that carrying all types of witness plates be a requirement but
that the potential use be aggressively explored.
4.4.3 Assays
As late as is practical before launch, assays should be made of the different
types of contaminants present on different spacecraft components. The assays should
include not only viable organisms, but also organic compounds and cell debris.
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5 TRANSPORT OF SAMPLES FROM MARS TO EARTH
5.1 General Statement
This section deals with concerns about back contamination, beginning with transfer
of the samples from Mars and continuing through activities associated with the SRF on Earth.
How the samples should be handled after receipt in the SRF is discussed in the next section.
The NRC recommendations listed in 1.4.2.1 through 1.4.2.3 above are those that are
relevant to transfer of samples from Mars to the Earth. In summary, these
recommendations are:
(1) No uncontained martian materials, including spacecraft materials that have been
exposed to the martian surface, should be returned to Earth unless sterilized.
(2) If sample containment cannot be verified, the samples should either be sterilized
in space or not be returned to Earth.
(3) Integrity of containment should be maintained through re-entry of the spacecraft
and transfer of the sample to an appropriate receiving facility.
5.2 Sample Containment
We recommend that the samples be contained to a high confidence level before
leaving the martian surface. We further recommend that introduction of unsterilized
martian material into the Earth's environment be kept to a very low probability,
predominately through system design using seals and filters, rather than through
monitoring containment and incorporating various contingency responses into the
design. Containment is to be maintained until the sample is in an appropriate receiving
facility.
In the current architecture, the sample caches on the rover are to be delivered to a
sample canister in the mini-MAV and launched into Mars orbit. The Earth Return Vehicle
(ERV) must then retrieve the sample canister and place it within the Earth-Entry Vehicle
(EEV). Transfer must be effected in such a way that no martian materials, other
than the contained sample, are transferred. The sample canister must be sealed
before it makes its rendezvous with the ERV in order to preserve the sample under
the conditions at the martian surface, and as a first line of defense against
uncontrolled release. The ERV will then transport the EEV to Earth and deliver it to a
target for entry into the Earth's atmosphere. The EEV must be designed such that there is a
high probability of maintaining containment during entry into the Earth's atmosphere and
during landing.
5.2.1 Nominal Earth Entry Conditions
We believe that the best approach to containment of the martian sample during
return to Earth is one that emphasizes the reliability of the containment system itself, rather
than a system based on containment monitoring and incorporation of various responses, such
as sample sterilization or spacecraft diversion, that might be used in different contingencies.
The containment system (Figure 5-1) can be designed to be extremely robust and allow its
reliability to be extensively tested before launch. In contrast, monitoring the functioning of
a containment system in real time raises reliability issues for both the containment system
and a likely complex monitoring system. Continual monitoring of biological containment
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Figure 5-1. Earth Entry Capsule (March 1999 design from M. Adler, JPL)
after sealing and during transit to Earth is difficult to verify in real time. What monitoring
techniques could be used? Gas losses from the container might be monitored, but the
sensitivities required to ensure complete biological containment may not be practical.
Further, if a signal is received signifying containment loss, is that signal real or due to a
malfunction of the monitoring system? If a system were included in the EEV to sterilize or
destroy the sample in the event of an indication of loss of containment, how does one verify
the proper operation of that system? The most likely time for failure of sample
containment is upon landing on Earth, when the EEV is subject to its highest g-loading. If
containment were to fail during landing, there probably would be insufficient time to consult
monitoring systems or to take mitigating steps to counter possible loss of containment.
Because of these uncertainties, we conclude that resources are better spent devising a fail-safe
containment system rather than elaborate monitoring systems and contingency capabilities.
Long-term isolation of biologically hazardous materials in terrestrial laboratories is
managed by both seals and filters. We conclude that extremely robust containment
systems can be built using multiple seals and HEPA filters or their equivalents. To
achieve containment, we recommend that the primary sample container be sealed to high
reliability, such as by explosive welding, and be able to withstand high stresses that might be
encountered on landing. We recommend further that additional seals and biological filters be
incorporated into the re-entry spacecraft to act as additional biological barriers in the
unlikely case of primary barrier failure. Thus, HEPA filters could be placed between the
different sealed sections, for example, between the sample canister and the rest of the EEV.
The combined use of seals and filters may offer the additional advantage of having failure
modes that are likely different. Such a dual seal/filter system, in the unlikely event of a
primary seal failure, would catch any leaking material in the HEPA filters in the same way
that hazardous materials from terrestrial laboratories are prevented from leaking into the
environment. Such a design could lead to extremely low probabilities of containment failure
(Carr et al., 1998).
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While we are advocating against continual monitoring of the seal integrity,
we are recommending verification of the primary sealing of the inner sample
container at Mars. A one-time verification of this seal might be achieved by optical
inspection while on Mars, by verifying that the container still contains martian ambient
atmospheric pressure once it reaches the vacuum conditions of orbit, or by some other
procedure.
5.2.2 Anomalous Earth Entry Conditions
The discussion in the previous section pertains only to the most probable situation,
where the EEV maintains its integrity during Earth entry. Clearly if the EEV enters the
Earth's atmosphere anomalously and disintegrates, then the performance of the seals and
filters may become immaterial. These low-probability, anomalous events must be modeled to
demonstrate that the probability of unplanned introduction of martian materials into the
Earth's environment as a consequence of them is very low.
Management of the Earth Return trajectory will be an important element in reducing
vulnerability to anomalous Earth entry conditions. The initial trajectory of the ERV should
be biased far enough away from the Earth such that failure of the ERV before final targeting
of the EEV is highly unlikely to result in encounter with the Earth.
5.3 Contingency Sterilization
The NRC task group on sample-return recommended that if containment cannot be
verified, then the samples should be sterilized or not returned to the Earth. As indicated
above, we are questioning the need for a contingency sterilization. If the sealing is
successful at Mars, then failure of the seal during return to the Earth is viewed as
an extremely low probability. The most likely times for seal failure are at Mars, when
the primary seal is made, and during Earth entry and landing. A capability for in-flight
sterilization offers no protection against failure at Earth. The primary justification for
contingency sterilization is for use in the event of a seal failure at Mars. Given that resources
are limited, they may be better spent in designing more reliable seals, with the understanding
that the samples would not be returned in the unlikely event that the seals fail.
5.4 Sample Preservation
Scientific guidelines for preservation of samples collected from Mars are summarized
in Table 5-1 from Gooding (1990). The main issue in sample preservation is temperature.
Different effects occur at different temperatures; these range from loss of gas to changes in
mineralogy. It is difficult to argue that temperatures should be maintained below the
maximum experienced on Mars. For the initial sample-return missions, all samples will have
been collected within a few centimeters of the surface. For this depth, all samples should
have commonly experienced temperatures at least as high as 240 K. There is, therefore, a
strong desire to keep the sample below this temperature during cruise, Earth entry, and
landing. We recognize that this may be impractical during landing, but since the effects on
the sample will depend on the time spent at undesirably high temperatures, we recommend
that the system be designed to minimize these times.
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Table5-I. ConditionsRecommendedfor Preservation
of MartianSamplesbyGooding(1990)
Contamination
Temperature
Pressure(head-spacegas)
For eachelement,<1%of theconcentration
in Shergottymeteorite(Rock,sediment,or
soil sample)
Foreachelementor compound,<1%of the
concentrationin theViking lander
atmosphericanalyses(atmosphericsample)
<260K (igneousrocksample,unweathered)
<230K (soil, sediment,deepregolith, or
weathered rock sample)
<1 x 105 Pa (1 atm) (igneous rock sample,
unweathered)
<1 x 103 Pa (0.01 atm) (soil, sediment, deep
regolith, or weathered rock sample)
Ionizing radiation 5 g/cm 2 shielding
Magnetic fields <5.7E-0.05 Tesla (1 Earth field)
Acceleration/Shock <7 g (1 g = 9.81 m/s 2)
5.5 Aseptic Transfer
No martian materials other than those contained within the sample
canister can be returned to Earth. In order to prevent delivery of martian
materials to the Earth on spacecraft components, the cache containing the samples
must be sealed on the martian surface and delivered to the Earth Return Vehicle
(ERV) without contaminating the vehicle with martian materials.
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6 SAMPLE HANDLING ON THE GROUND
6.1 General Approach
Consistent with the recommendations of the NRC Task Group, the samples are to be
assumed hazardous until proven otherwise. This requires that the sample canister be returned
to, and opened in, a containment facility that protects the Earth's environment and
inhabitants from potential hazards. The facility must also protect the samples from
terrestrial chemical and biological contamination. Portions of the sample may be removed
from containment for additional studies, but only if sterilized first.
Three types of analyses will be done on the samples:
(1) Hazard analysis, in which the potential of the samples as a threat to the
terrestrial environment and its inhabitants is assessed.
(2) Life detection, in which evidence for past or present life is assessed.
(3) Geochemical characterization directed at better understanding the evolution of
the planet.
The three types of testing are not mutually independent. The assessment of whether
the samples could be hazardous will, for example, depend on life detection testing and on
various geochemical characteristics of the samples, such as the organic carbon content.
A guiding principle behind the procedures for handling martian samples should be to
use the best available technology and expertise. We also anticipate that there will be
considerable public interest in expeditiously determining if the samples present a hazard and if
any form of life is present. In practice, comprehensive, rigorous testing may be
difficult or impossible to accomplish at a single facility. To accomplish the
planetary protection and scientific goals, we should capitalize on the diverse
analytical capabilities and expertise of the scientific community at large. We are
recommending, therefore, that soon after receipt of the samples (after they have
been classified, examined, and imaged for archival purposes) a small subset of the
samples be sterilized and distributed to the science community for geochemical
characterization, while other analyses, mainly hazard assessment and life
detection, are being conducted behind the biobarrier. It may also be desirable to
send contained samples from the Sample-return Facility to other, well
instrumented biosafety facilities, such as Center for Disease Control (CDC), using
well established procedures for transporting biohazardous materials, but with
special attention to avoiding terrestrial contamination.
The results of the preliminary life detection and hazard experiments, combined with
early findings on the sterilized samples may be sufficient to declare the samples
nonhazardous, in which case the samples could be removed from behind the biobarrier to a
curation facility, as they were during the Apollo program. In the more likely case that the
results of the preliminary tests are inconclusive, more definitive tests would then be designed
using the knowledge gained from the analyses already completed. This approach allows
geochemical characterization by the science community at large to proceed while preliminary
hazard detection and life detection testing is being done. Definitive hazard analysis and life
detection testing may be a lengthy process, particularly if there are positive indications,
either real or false, in the early testing. Figures 6-1 through 6-3 indicate how the samples
should be handled and some of the issues that must be addressed at each stage.
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6.2 Apollo Experience
During six sample-retum missions of the Apollo program, 382 kg of lunar rocks and
soil, comprising 2196 individual specimens were returned. In contrast the first sample-return
mission from Mars is expected to return a few to several hundred grams of rocks and soils,
comprising less than 50 individual samples. To handle the lunar samples, an 8000-m 2 Lunar
Receiving Laboratory was built at Johnson Space Center at a cost of roughly $130 M in 1998
dollars. At the height of the quarantine phase of the project, 200 technicians worked three
shifts a day to support 100 NASA civil servants and visiting scientists. At the conclusion of
the program, all the samples were moved to a facility more suitable for sample curation and
preservation. A building specially designed to keep the samples pure was completed in 1979
and has been operated since with a staff of less than 20 people (Allton, 1996).
For Apollo, an Interagency Committee on Back Contamination (ICBC) advised
NASA on quarantine procedures. Testing for toxic and infectious agents was done behind a
biobarrier by a Biosciences and Containment Group. A Preliminary Examination Team
(PET) performed the initial geologic and geochemical examination of the samples in the
quarantine facility, and a Lunar Sample Analysis and Planning Team (LSAPT) was concerned
primarily with sample preservation and allocation, functions now performed by the
CAPTEM.
A major difference between Apollo and return of Mars samples is that Apollo had to
be concerned with potential effects of the lunar samples on the crews. This affected facilities
design, experimental protocols, and the time within which quarantine issues had to be
resolved. A goal of the testing was to provide safety clearance for lunar samples within a
period of approximately 30 days (NASA 1965 Summer Conference on Lunar Exploration
and Science). With the Mars samples, there is much less need for rapid validation that the
samples are safe for distribution, particularly if sterilized samples are released while validation
is underway.
6.3 Sample-Handling Facilities
Our perception of the sample-handling facilities differs somewhat from that
enunciated by the TGISR, and this is in part enabled by the approach described in section 6.1.
The sample-handling facilities should mainly serve the science community rather
than do independent research. The main functions of the facilities are to keep
unsterilized samples isolated from the terrestrial environment until they have been
demonstrated to be harmless, to do whatever testing is needed to evaluate whether the
samples are harmless, and to get well preserved samples out to the science community safely
and as expeditiously as possible. While these are the main functions, some additional tasks,
which are research in nature, may need to be done because they must be done immediately
upon receipt of the samples and/or because they must be done behind a biobarrier.
The sample-handling facilities can be viewed as consisting of two components: a
sample receiving facility (SRF) and a sample curation facility (SCF). The two facilities could
be in separate locations, but there is overlap in functions between the two and they need not
be two separate physical entities.
The SRF should have the following functions:
(1) Prevent uncontrolled introduction of martian materials into the terrestrial
environment.
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(2) Preservetheintegrityof thesamplesby minimizingalterationandterrestrial
contamination.
(3) Make an inventory of the samples and perform those analyses on the samples
that are needed to intelligently select samples for sterilization and early
distribution to the science community.
(4) Perform selected sample analyses.
(5) Test for any possible hazards within the samples.
(6) Sterilize some subset of the samples.
(7) Maintain accurate historical records on the samples.
The SRF must be designed both to contain the samples behind a biobarrier and to
preserve the samples from terrestrial contamination. Such a facility does not yet exist to
our knowledge.
If the samples do not contain a biological hazard, then they and any remaining
sterilized samples would be transferred to a sample curation facility (SCF) whose functions
would be to:
(1) Preserve the samples.
(2) Classify and document the samples, and make the information publicly available.
(3) Prepare and distribute samples for research and education.
(4) Maintain historical records of all the samples.
The curatorial facility at JSC is designed specifically to perform these functions for
NASA for extraterrestrial materials in general. We see no reason why it should not do the
same for Mars, although modifications may be needed in order to appropriately preserve
martian samples.
6.4 Sample Receiving Facility
6.4.1 SRF Functions and Their Implementation
Some of the capabilities of the SRF and some of the procedures that might be
followed in order to accomplish its task are described below under the separate functions listed
above.
6.4.1.1 Prevent Uncontrolled Introduction of Martian Materials into Terrestrial
Environment. Until it has been demonstrated that the samples do not present a hazard, all
nonsterilized samples must remain behind a biobarrier. No quantitative standards exist for
different levels of biocontainment; containment levels are specified in terms of the
procedures that are followed.
"The term 'containment' is used in describing safe methods for managing infectious
agents in the laboratory environment where they are being handled or maintained. The
purpose of containment is to reduce or eliminate exposure to laboratory workers, other
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persons,andtheoutsideenvironmentto potentialhazardousagents."(CDC-NIHManual,
1993).
Therearethreeelementsof containment:laboratorypracticeandtechnique,safety
equipment,andfacility design. In thebiomedicalcommunity,therisk assessmentof the
work to bedonewith a specificagentdeterminestheappropriatecombinationof these
elements.Althougha putativemartianentity(if anyexists)in returnedmaterialswouldbe
consideredanunknownbiologicalagent,theCDC-NIHguidelinesarestill applicableand
appropriate.
Primarycontainment,he protectionof personnelandtheimmediatelaboratory
environmentfrom exposureto hazardousagents,is providedby goodmicrobiological
techniques,biobarriers,andtheuseof appropriatesafetyequipment.Secondarycontainment,
the protectionof theenvironmentexternalto the laboratoryfrom exposureto infectious
material,is providedby a combinationof facility designandoperationalpractices.
TheCDC-NIHmanual(1993)describesfourbiosafetylevels(BSLs)whichconsistof
combinationsof laboratorypracticesandtechniques,safetyequipment,andlaboratory
facilities. Eachcombinationis specificallyappropriatefor theoperationsperformed,for the
documentedor suspectedroutesof transmissionof the infectiousagents,andfor the
laboratoryfunctionor activity. Containmentis typicallymaintainedby useof HEPAand
ultra low penetrationair (ULPA)filters,by managingpressureswithin thecontainmentarea,
andby ensuringthatall tools,containers,materialsandequipmentareremovedfrom the
containmentareaonlythroughsterilizertransferlocks. How containmentis effectedand
adaptedfor martiansampleswill dependonwhatprocessingandanalysesmustbedonebehind
abiobarrier.Somepossiblealtemativesthathavebeensuggestedinclude:
(1) Build aBSL-4containmentlaboratoryin whichall personnelwearbiological
barriersuits.Townsend(1990),for example,recommendedbuildinga 370m2
(4000 ft 2) BSL-4 Biological Testing Complex to handle Mars samples.
(2) Do all the processing and analyses within interconnected Class III Biological
Safety Cabinets, with sealable doors between cabinets, all contained within a
'high-end' BL-3 containment laboratory. (Recommendation of the Containment
Subgroup of the Mars Quarantine Protocol Workshop, NASA/Ames, June 4--6,
1997).*
(3) Acquire a number of commercial, modular, CDC-certified, biocontainment
laboratories and ship them to an appropriate location. Atter the results of the
early analyses are completed, expand or contract the modular laboratory as
needed.
(4) Capitalize on existing, well instrumented BSL-4 facilities (as at CDC) and either
locate the receiving laboratory adjacent to them or, for some testing, ship
selected samples to these facilities, following well-established procedures for the
shipping of hazardous biological materials. We acknowledge that some existing
facilities might be used for some specialized testing because of their unique
combination of containment and instrumentation. Existing facilities are,
however, unlikely to be usable for the general handling of martian samples, unless
considerably modified, because they do not have the appropriate controls for
terrestrial contamination, as listed below under 6.3.1.2.
*Draft in review: DeVincenzi, D.L., et al. (editors), 1998. Proceedings, Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol
Workshop, NASA/Ames, June 4-6, 1997, Preliminary draft. NASA/Ames internal document, 6/12/98.
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Thepossibleapproachesdescribedabovearenotmutuallyexclusive.A modular
BSL-3labwith ClassIII safetycabinetscouldbeusedinconjunctionwithexistingBSL-4
facilities. Whilewehavenotexploredin depthhowtheSRFshouldbeconfigured,weare
skeptical of the need for a complex facility of the type described in (1) above, and
used during the Apollo mission. We believe that all the applicable biocontainment
requirements can be met in a modest-sized, modular receiving facility with BSL-4
areas, coupled with distribution of sterilized subsamples to the science
community. If it is deemed appropriate, nonsterilized samples can be shipped to
other BSL-4 facilities, using established procedures for shipping biohazardous
materials, in conjunction with the necessary measures for avoiding terrestrial
contamination.
6.4.1.2 Preserve Sample Integrity. The main concern here is protecting the samples
from terrestrial chemical and biological contamination. Secondary concerns are cross-
contamination between samples and degradation of the samples by being maintained at
conditions that differ from Mars ambient conditions. Control of terrestrial contamination
requires that all gases in contact with the samples be filtered. Air coming into the SRF must
be filtered for contamination control; the outgoing air must be filtered for containment.
Similarly all tools, reagents, and surfaces must be sterilized and cleaned.
In order to minimize terrestrial contamination, the following should be considered
(extracted and paraphrased from Townsend, 1990):
(1) It is essential to provide controls and identify materials used in the construction
of all tools, equipment, containers, and environmental cabinets used in handling,
processing, and storage of samples. Many construction materials were considered
for the Apollo program, but were narrowed down to steel, aluminum, and Teflon.
These materials have proven effective over the years in protection of the lunar
samples.
(2) No plastics of any kind, except the unplasticized fluorocarbon Teflon should be
used, except in gaskets that would not have contact with the samples.
(3) The most undesirable contaminants are Pb, U, Th, Li, Be, B, K, organic
compounds, and microorganisms (living or dead). Other undesirable contaminants
are Rb, Sr, noble gases, and rare earths.
(4) There must be provision for individual samples with apparent differences to be
packaged separately and hermetically sealed to prevent particulate, gaseous, and
biological cross-contamination.
(5) All tools, containers, and equipment used to handle and process Mars samples
must be sterilized, cleaned, and packaged according to approved cleaning
procedures, such as Graf (1971), and be introduced into the containment area
only through a sterilizer transfer lock.
Long-term storage of the samples should be under a noncontaminating gas (such as
nitrogen) and at temperatures as close to the 240 K as is practical.
6.4.1.3 Sample Inventory. The SRF must separately package, inventory, and make a
preliminary characterization of all the samples. Characterization will include weighing,
photographing, and preparing geologic descriptions. It could include nondestructive analyses
such as x-ray fluorescent spectrometry (XRFS) and spectral measurements. The inventory
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anddescriptionswould be performed by the PET and be provided to CAPTEM and the
science community at large to support decisions on sample sterilization and distribution.
6.4.1.4 Perform Selected Sample Analyses. While in principle we advocate
minimizing the amount of analysis that is done in the SRF, some analyses will need to be
done there because:
(1) They are necessary for choosing the samples to be sterilized and distributed to the
science community.
(2) They are time critical.
(3) They cannot be done on sterilized samples and so must be done at the SRF or
another containment facility.
Some analysis may be judged to be time critical because of public pressure to get early
results on samples or because sample deterioration prevents the analyses being done at a later
date. It will, for example, be desirable to do some life detection tests in the SRF almost
immediately upon the sample receipt, because of public interest to get an early assessment of
the possibility of life in the samples. Moreover, such preliminary tests will help design
subsequent tests. Such preliminary tests are, however, unlikely to be definitive.
Life detection tests fall into two categories: those for detection of extant life and
those for detection of past life. Much of the early chemical and morphological search for
past life can be done on sterilized samples. Testing for viable organisms can only be done on
unsterilized samples and must be done behind a biobarrier. This testing could be done either in
the SRF or an equivalent facility that has the required safeguards for both protecting the
samples and preventing uncontrolled release. Because of the rapid evolution of biological
testing techniques, it is premature at this time to judge what techniques might be used to
detect extant life in 2008 when the first samples will be returned.
Some analyses will need to be done at the SRF because they cannot be done at a later
date. With lunar samples, for example, short-lived radionuclides were determined
immediately upon receipt, before they could decay to undetectable levels. Because of the
long transit time from Mars, there is less need for immediate analyses, although
determination of labile constituents in the soil may be advisable since significant changes may
occur under laboratory conditions.
6.4.1.5 Test for Possible Hazards. One of the prime functions of the sample
receiving facility is to test the samples for possible hazards. The protocols for hazard testing
will likely be developed over the next several years by the equivalent of Apollo's Biosciences
and Containment Group under the direction of a committee equivalent to the ICBC. An
indication of what that testing might be is given in the recommendations of the Biohazard
and Testing Subgroup of the Mars Sample Quarantine workshop held at NASA/Ames in
1997.** The following is an abstract of the subgroup's recommendations.
(1) Chemical Toxicity. Because of the small amount of material to be returned,
chemical toxicity is not considered a significant threat.
**Draft in review: DeVincenzi, D.L., et al. (editors), 1998. Proceedings, Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol
Workshop, NASA/Ames, June 4--6, 1997, Preliminary draft. NASA/Ames internal document, 6/12/98.
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(2) Pathogenicity.Pathogenesiscanbeof two types:toxic, in whichmetabolic
productsor cell componentsincidentallyharmotherorganisms,andinfectiousin
whichtheagentmustmultiply in or onthehostto causedamage.Bothshouldbe
testedfor in themartiansamples.TheApollo programchallengetestprotocols
initially included69speciesfrom 10animalphylaand34speciesin nineplant
divisions. Consequently,it requiredelaborateanimalsupportandcontamination
controlswithin thequarantinefacility (Allton, 1998). In light of thesignificant
advancesin theuseof modelsystemsandtissuecultures,aswellasimprovements
in technologicalcapabilitiesoverthepastfewdecades,thesubgroupconcurred
thatit wouldnotbenecessaryto conductwholeorganismchallengetestsaspart
of the first-line screening for returned martian samples. In-vitro methods are
deemed far superior for preliminary biohazard screening because of their
sensitivity, simplicity, and speed, as well as their widespread use, acceptance, and
interpretation. By selecting a suitably diverse range of in-vitro tests and
conditions, it will be possible to screen for biologically important outcomes that
might be indicative of biohazards in a wide range of representative species and
taxonomic groups. The subgroup recommended in-vitro testing of the following,
all of which could be done in Class III biosafety cabinets:
(a) Diverse microbial media using varied laboratory starting conditions
(b) Selected tissue cultures and cell lines from: mammalian organ systems,
fishes, and insects
(c) Embryonating chicken eggs
(d) Plant tissue culture (wheat, rice, potato)
In addition the subgroup discussed inclusion of two types of whole organism tests:
a series of laboratory mice injection studies (because of their extensive use for pathogenicity
and biohazard testing), and a series of tests using Tetrahymena (as a model for metazoan
biochemistry). Such tests might be included both for science reasons and for reasons of public
acceptance.
While it is considered very unlikely that putative martian organisms could compete
successfully against terrestrial organisms in terrestrial habitats (see section 1.3 above), there
are uncertainties. The Biohazard and Testing Subgroup at the June 4-6, 1997 (DeVincenzi et
al.) Ames workshop accordingly recommended two types of microcosm tests. The first was
designed to assay for disruptions of important representative microbial systems upon addition
of martian materials, and the second was to determine if any martian biological entities can
grow or propagate in selected microcosms of representative terrestrial ecosystems. Details
are given in Appendix B of DeVincenzi, et al. (1999).***
What constitutes a representative sample will be an important component of the
analytical strategy, and this may not be resolvable until more information is known about the
samples actually returned.
***Draft in review: DeVincenzi, D.L., et al. (editors), 1998. Proceedings, Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol
Workshop, NASA/Ames, June 4--6, 1997, Preliminary draft. NASA/Ames internal document, 6/12/98.
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6.4.1.6Sterilize a Subset of the Samples. The SRF must have the capability of
sterilizing a subset of the samples for release from the facility and distribution to
the science community. This implies capabilities within the SRF for making splits of
individual rock and soil samples and for doing the sterilization. Based on the work of Allen
(1998), we are recommending gamma radiation as the sterilizing agent. It is effective, yet
minimizes changes to the samples. Commercial sterilizers are available. The viruses Ebola
and Lassa are inactivated at < 1 Mrad, and the USDA recommends 6 Mrad for virus
inactivation in biological materials. D. radiodurans, a radiation-resistant bacterium, is
sterilized at 3-8 Mrad. The spore-forming bacteria B. subtilis and C. sporogenes in basalt
cores have been sterilized in the 3-30 Mrad range. The doses should significantly exceed
those required to deactivate any known form of microbial life. The dose levels are to be
determined, but dosages in excess of 30 Mrad may be needed.
We are recommending that work on gamma sterilization be aggressively
pursued to determine the gamma ray toleration limits of radiation-resistant
terrestrial life forms and to better assess the effects of high radiation doses on
different rock materials. The strategy for sample handling outlined in this chapter is
totally dependent on our being able to distribute early sterilized samples to the science
community. If this capability is not available, then far more analyses would need to be done
in the containment facility, and the SRF would be correspondingly more complex and
expensive.
6.4.2 Options to be Considered in Design of Sample Receiving Facility
6.4.2.1 Duty Cycle: An SRF Facili_ty That Is Used Only Intermittently
(a) Design based on the assumption that hazard testing will prove the samples are
harmless. In this case the SRF is used intermittently, for a short period after each
sample-return mission, after which the samples are transferred to the SCF.
(b) Design assumes that the samples will be hazardous, that unsterilized samples will
remain permanently in the SRF, and that any analyses requiring unsterilized
samples will be done in the SPY or some other biocontainment facility.
6.4.2.2 Materials Examined: Mars Samples Only or Any Extraterrestrial Materials
(a) Facility is used exclusively for martian materials.
(b) Facility is used for all extraterrestrial materials that are judged to require
containment and hazard assessment.
6.4.2.3 Level of Instrumentation Needed
(a) Analyses at the SPY are restricted to benchtop testing, and samples (both
sterilized and unsterilized) are shipped to other facilities for analyses requiring
more complex instrumentation.
(b) SPY is built to satisfy all'the analytical needs that are anticipated for the time
prior to their validation as harmless, after which the capabilities of the
community at large could be utilized.
6.4.2.4 Example of a Processing Plan. The following processing plan (Table 6-1)
envisions a relatively modest Mars SPY for the purpose of quarantining the samples and
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Table6-1. Exampleof a Mars Sample Processing Plan
PET Activities Inside Biobarrier Outside Biobarrier
Receive sample container into Mars SRF
Extract and analyze gases in head space
Remove samples and document types: weigh,
photograph, number, etc.
Perform optical examination of samples
Select sample suites for testing
Store sample remainder in martian ambient
Conduct basic biohazard/life tests (in-vitro?) Conduct preliminary analyses on sterilized sample
Gamma sterilize some material for additional for total carbon, organics, chemical composition,
tests mineralogy, and TBD, in selected laboratories
If life/biohazard/organics detected If no life/biohazard/organics detected
Proceed below Decision for con_'olled release
Prepare quarantined sample for more extensive Detailed bio/organic analyses of witness plates
biohazard testing in state-of-the-art laboratories Possible additional geochemical analyses on
(whether inside or outside Mars SRF is TBD) sterilized samples
If martian life/biohazard confirmed If no martian biohazard detected
Perform all analyses inside quarantine or on Decide about controlled release
sterilized samples Transfer part/all of samples to curation facility
Allocate for detailed scientific analyses worldwide
conducting preliminary geochemical and biohazard analyses. Additional preliminary
geochemical analyses on sterilized samples could be conducted in outside laboratories. If any
indications exist for complex organics or biohazards in the samples, the plan envisions
prearranged elaborate biohazard testing of martian material in outside, variously instrumented
laboratories as well as full analyses of witness plates taken before and during the mission.
This plan would allow the most efficient use of limited mission resources under the most
likely scenario that the probability of detection of a biohazard in returned martian samples is
very small. The plan would also involve selected outside laboratories in sample analyses and
testing early in the process. A different sample-processing plan would be to construct a large
and complex containment facility in which a broad variety of biohazard, life detection and
geochemical analyses could be conducted. Full justification for such a facility would exist
only in the low probability case that a biohazard is found to be present in the martian
samples.
6.5 Sample Curation Facility (SCF)
Once samples have been removed from biocontainment, responsibility for their
custody shifts from the SRF to the SCF. Removal of samples from biocontainment may be
enabled because they are sterilized or because the samples have been found to be harmless.
Release of sterilized samples may take place within days or weeks of return of the samples.
Determination that the samples are harmless could take months to years. In the unlikely
event that the samples are found to be harmful, then the samples would have to be
permanently stored under appropriate biocontainment within the SRF or elsewhere
(or sterilized).
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Themainfunctionsof theSCFareto preservethesamplesand to make them
available to the community for research and education. The existing curation facility at JSC
currently performs these functions. It has 30 years experience in handling extraterrestrial
materials, and we see no reason why it should not continue to perform the same functions for
martian samples.
6.6 Management Issues
A dual management structure similar to that adopted by Apollo may be required, with
one entity being responsible for addressing planetary protection issues and a second entity
being responsible for science. The planetary protection management would be responsible for
assessing whether the samples present any threat. The science management would be
responsible for doing the scientific evaluation, including whether the samples contain
evidence of past life or present life. The management structure must incorporate
mechanisms for resolving routine scientific conflicts, such as might arise over sample
allocation and facility use.
6.6.1 Planetary Protection Management
6.6.1.1 Interagency Committee on Back Contamination (ICBC). An international
committee like the ICBC should be established to provide advice on planetary protection
issues, such as certifying that the samples are safe for release and establishing protocols for
testing for biohazards.
6.6.1.2 Planetary Protection Team. A Planetary Protection Team should be
established to implement the recommendations of the ICBC. The team should consist
mostly of permanent staff that should be in place at the SRF 1-2 years prior to
receipt of samples in order to develop procedures for assessing if the samples are
hazardous, to test those procedures, and to become thoroughly familiar with
protocols for working within the containment facility. This permanent staff may be
supplemented by a small number of non-resident scientists, but they must also expect to
spend a significant fraction of their time in the year before sample receipt, at the SRF
familiarizing themselves with the operation of the facility.
6.6.2 Science Management
A guiding principle behind the procedures for handling martian samples
outlined here is to capitalize as much as possible on the analytical capabilities of
the scientific community at large, and to minimize the amount of analysis done at
the sample receiving facility. We envisage that most of the science will be managed in the
same way that science on other extraterrestrial materials is managed, that is through the
NRA and peer review process. A possible exception is the work done by the Preliminary
Examination Team (PET). It will do the basic characterization of the samples needed to
formulate the subsequent analytical plan. Analyses at the SRF should be limited to those
required (1) to intelligently distribute sterilized samples, (2) to determine if the samples are
harmful, or (3) because of their time criticality. Almost all the analyses recommended above
to be done at the SRF are benchtop tests, not requiring elaborate instrumentation. We
emphasize that the SRC should be a service facility, not a research facility.
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6.6.3 PET
The initial characterization of the samples would be done by a Preliminary
Examination Team (PET) under the guidance of CAPTEM or its equivalent. The functions
of the PET would be to:
(1) Extract the samples from the sample container and package them appropriately.
(2) Do the preliminary characterization of the samples.
(3) Prepare sample splits for sterilization, hazard analysis, and other analyses deemed
necessary.
(4) Sterilize a subset of the samples.
(5) Perform time critical analyses, as required.
Like the Planetary Protection Team, the PET should consist largely of permanent
staff. It should be selected and in place at the SRF 1-2 years before receipt of the samples in
order to develop procedures for handling the samples and to become thoroughly acquainted
with those procedures. This permanent staff may be supplemented by a small number of
non-resident scientists, but they must also expect to spend a significant fraction of their time
in the year before sample receipt at the SRF familiarizing themselves with the operation of
the facility.
6.6.4 CAPTEM
CAPTEM, or its equivalent, will advise NASA on the activities of the PET, on
managing the longer-term curation of the samples, and on allocating them to the science
community. Its functions would be to:
(1) Develop a long-term strategy for scientific analysis of the samples, including life-
detection experiments.
(2) Provide oversight on the activities of the PET.
(3) Advise NASA on the content of the NRA for scientific analysis of released
samples, conduct peer review of proposals, and advise on allocation of samples to
chosen experimenters.
(4) Advise NASA on preservation and long-term curation of the samples at the SCF.
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7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
. The search for evidence of life, particularly past life, is a primary objective of the
Mars exploration program. Parallel and intimately connected goals are
determination of the planet's climate and of the planet's geologic histories.
2. Many of the outstanding biologic, climatologic, and geologic issues with respect
to Mars are unlikely to be resolved until we have a variety of returned samples.
, The present martian surface is very hostile to life because of its low temperatures,
the lack of liquid water, the high UV flux, the presence of oxidants, and the
scarcity of organics.
. The chances of finding extant life in samples returned from the martian surface
are very low, and even if extant life were present, it would be unlikely to have
significant ecological impact or other harmful effects on the Earth. The risk is
not zero, however.
. Because we cannot demonstrate that the risk is zero, the returned samples should
be assumed to be potentially harmful until proven otherwise. They should be
placed in sealed containers on Mars, and the containers should be opened only in
a BSL-4 containment facility here on Earth. No samples should leave BSL-4
containment unless sterilized or proven to be harmless.
6. Return of samples to the International Space Station is impractical and is likely
to be more risky than returning them to Earth.
. Sterilizing samples at Mars is not advocated because sterilization would be difficult
to accomplish and verify remotely on Mars, and sterilization would destroy much
of the biologic and climatologic information in the samples.
o We endorse the current Athena sample acquisition plan to use a rover to acquire
primarily rock cores, with a few additional soil samples. We strongly advocate
acquisition of a contingency sample by the lander, although this need not be
returned if the rover mission is successful.
9. The sampling strategy should be aimed at acquiring the maximum variety of
samples from the sites visited.
10. Contamination of the samples with terrestrial materials is of considerable concern
because it could compromise the science results from the samples. Also, any false
positives on hazard assessment and life detection tests would confuse
interpretation of analytical results from the samples and could significantly delay
release of unsterilized samples from BSL-4 containment for distribution to the
science community.
1 l. All components that land on the martian surface must be cleaned to at least
Pathfinder levels of cleanliness.
12. All spacecraft components that touch the samples must be sterilized and cleaned
to significantly higher standards than Pathfinder.
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13.Recognizingthatsomecontaminationof thesamplescouldoccur,westrongly
advocatetheuseof tracers,witnessplates,andassaysto helpidentify
adventitiouscontaminants.Wedo not,however,advocatedeliberately
impregnatingthedrill bitswith tracersbecauseof concernsthatcontaminationof
thesamplesbythetracerswouldbesignificantandwouldinterferewith sample
analysis.
14.The sample canister must be sealed before leaving the martian surface, and the
integrity of the seal should be confirmed either before leaving the martian surface
or while in orbit at Mars.
15. The sample canister must be transferred to the Earth Retnm Vehicle (ERV) in
such a way that the only martian materials on the ERV are those sealed within
the sample canister.
16. Insofar as it is practical during return to Earth, the samples should be maintained
at temperatures no higher than 240 K, the maximum temperature they are likely
to have experienced on Mars. It is especially desirable that the samples not be
allowed to experience temperatures above 270 K.
17. We recommend that introduction of unsterilized material into the Earth's
environment be kept to a very low probability, mainly by system design, such as
by multiple seals and interleaved filters, rather than through monitoring
containment and incorporating various contingency responses into the design.
We believe the most likely times of containment failure are at the surface of
Mars, when a decision could be made not to return the samples, and during entry
and landing at Earth, when monitoring has little value. Limited resources are
better used by designing against failure rather than by monitoring and contingency
mechanisms.
18. After reaching Earth, the sample canister must be opened in a sample receiving
facility (SRF) with the equivalent of BSL-4 containment. The facility must also
meet the cleanliness standard used for handling extraterrestrial materials at JSC.
To our knowledge, no such facility now exists.
19. We view the SRF as primarily a service facility for the science community, rather
than a research facility. The facility will make an early inventory of the
samples, do some preliminary hazard assessment and life detection testing, and
sterilize a subset of the samples for distribution to the science community for
geochemical characterization.
20. Early distribution of a subset of sterilized samples is an essential element in both
scientific analysis of the samples and in assessing their potential for harm. The
geologic and geochemical characteristics of the samples, such as the presence and
nature of any organics, will be important for deciding what hazard and life
detection testing needs to be done. Geochemical characterization is most reliably
and comprehensively done by the at-large science community. Radiation
sterilization is the method of choice because of its minimal effects on the
geochemical character of the samples. Allocation of the distributed samples
should be by the normal NASA Research Announcement (NRA) Peer Review
process.
2 I. Some hazard assessment and life-detection experiments must be done in the SRF.
We think it premature to advise how these might best be done, given that
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technologieswill likely evolve considerably between now and 2008 when the first
samples return, but we suspect that hazard assessment will primarily involve
tissue-cell culture testing rather than tests on whole organisms.
22. Some of the hazard assessment and life-detection experiments could be done at
containment facilities other than the SRF by distributing unsterilized samples to
other containment facilities using well established procedures for handling and
transporting biohazardous materials.
23. The SRF can be scaled, built, and configured in a variety of ways, depending on
such factors as what testing is to be done in the facility, as opposed to testing
elsewhere, whether the facility is for Mars samples only or for extraterrestrial
materials in general, and how long the Mars sample-return program is to last. We
believe that an SRF built from modular, modest-sized, commercially available,
biosafety laboratories is appropriate for the early sample-returns. Should life be
detected and/or the samples prove to be hazardous, then more elaborate
alternatives could be built.
24. The SRF should be built, staffed, and operational 1-2 years before receipt of the
samples.
25. If and when the samples are found to be non-hazardous, the samples should be
transferred to a curation facility such as that at Johnson Space Center (JSC).
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Institute of Meteoritics
Earth & Planetary Sciences
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Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131
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To:
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Chair, _RPMichael H. Can', MSH_% •
J.J. Papike, Chair, CAPTEM _ _
,IJTracer _CAPTEM Review of Molecu Concept
For Mars 2001 Mission
Date: March 31,1998
At the request of Dr. Steve Squyres, CAPTEM conducted a review of the potential use of
moleculartracersfordetectionof organic/biologiccontaminationof Martiansamples tobe
collectedby the Athena payload on the Mars 2001 mission. The CAFTEM review
procedureand recommendationsareattached.This reportisbeing formallysubmittedto
MSHARP which istheappropriatecommitteetobeconcernedwithsuch issues.
MSHARP willhave todecideon how todealwith theserecommendations. IfMSHARP
agreeswiththereport,thentherecommendationscan be passedon toDr. CarlPilcherand
otherappropriateNASA administrators.
XC" MSHARP Committee Members
S. Squyres
S. Saunders
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LUNAR AND PLANETARY INSTITUTE
3600 BAY AREA BOULEVA,qO HOUSTON. TEXAS ?7058,1 { )3
TEL (713) ql6-213) FAX (713) 4M-gle2
March 27, 1998
A CAPTEM Assessment of the Use of Molecular Tracers for Detection of Organic/Biologic
Contamination of Martian Samples to Be Collected by the Athena Payload on the Mars 2001
Mission Rover.
BACKGROUND
On lanuary_, 1998 the Athena team for the Mars 2001 1_ssion gave a briefing to MSHARP (Dr
M. Can', Chair) on a molecular tracer technique that was proposed to be used to evaluate the
degree to which returned martian samples had been contaminated with terrestrial
biological/organic materials. Such an evaluation is important because, during the analysis of'
returned samples, round-trip terrestrial contamination (i.e., materials that traveled with the Athena
and Rover to Mars and returned back to Earth) might be mis-identified as martian organic
material or even asviable manias organisms. As a result of the briefing, MSHAgP expressed
concern to the Athena Pl, Dr. S. Squyres, about using the tracer technique but also recommended
that he get fi.u'ther input 6"om a knowledgeable panel of sample scientists. Dr. Squyres then
requested that CAPTEM review the tracer technique and its probable impact on the sample return
mission.
Consequently, on March 21, 1998, CAPTEM convened a special session at the Lunar and
Planetary Institute (Houston), and heard presentations by Dr. S. Squyres (Athena team Pl) and
Dr. T. Onstott (proposer of the molecular tracer technique). The committee was composed both
of regular CAPTEM members and ofapro tempore membership, invited in order to broaden
CAPTEM's scientific expertise (membership of the molecular tracer review subcommittee is given
below). CAPTEM was briefed about the Athena and Rover Mission as well as about the
molecular tracer technique. Mars samples are to be collected by a coring tool on the Athena
rover. The contamination assessment scheme involves intentional introduction of molecular tracer
materials into the coting drill assembly (and onto the Rover in general). The tracer materials
could then be analyzed in the drill core samples (aRer return to Earth) as monitors of Earth-
originated contamination that had entered the samples during drilling, handling, storage, and
processing.
Interest in molecular tracers of'terrestrial contamination comes From concerns that spacecraf_
surfaces may harbor viable micro-organisms (despite efforts at sterilization), that spacecral_
surfaces may not be free from molecular residue of microorganisms that were killed during
sterilization, and that non=sterile non-organically clean surfaces (like Rover wheels) may
inadvertently contact samples designated for return. Round-trip transport of viable
• CAFTEMis th_ Curationand AnalysisPlanning Team forExtraterr_'trialMaterials,convenedby the
NASA DisciplineScientistforCosmoch©mistry,JocBoyc¢.
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microorganisms during a Mars mission appears to be a reasonable possibility. For example, viable
bacterial spores apparently survived two and a half years exposure to the lunar environment on
the Surveyor 3 lander, before being returnedto Earth by the Apollo 12 mission. In a controlled
experiment, large numbers of Bacillus spores survived exposure to orbital conditions (with
minimal shielding) for six years on the LDEF satellite. Similar survival rates could be expected
for microbial stowaways on Mars missions. Viability aside, methods used to examine Martian
samples will undoubtedly detect biomolecules, such as nucleic acids or proteins, that could remain
even after microorganisms are effectively killed. While the best possible solution would be to
avoid transporting outbound microorganisms, practical Considerations suggest that some
outbound bio-contaminant will be inevitable.
To monitor and assess these potential sources ofcontamiruRion in returned samples, the Athena
team considered the application of easily detected, easily analyzed molecular tracers to Athena
and Rover components. The tracer concept offers an attractive,, relatively low cost means of
detecting contamination in a sample, under appropriate circumstances. Information from tracers
can potentially be both qualitative - indicating that communication between a sample and an
external environment has occurred - and quantitative. If proper mass balance measurements are
made, the degree to which a particular signal can be attributed to contamination can be estimated.
However, the sources of potential contamination must be clearly defined and at least partially
characterized for tracer methods to work. Viable tracers must be added directly to the source of
contamination and must move into the sample in the same way that the contaminants do. Where
multiple types and sources of contamination are possible, multiple tracers must also be used.
When in the sample, they must be distinct from native materials, and easily detected - preferably
with a detection limit several orders of magnitude lower than the contaminants of interest.
As presented to CAPTEM, molecular tracer schemes have been used successfi_lly in searches for
microorganisms deep in the Earth's crust. These organisms can be retrieved only by drilling, but
the driUing environment permits extensive contamination of retrieved cores. The most important
contaminant carrier is drilling mud, which is used to lubricate, pressurize, and sometimes power
the drilling operation. Drilling mud can be forced into the drill core and into the rock surrounding
the core, both of which could be sampled for indigenous microorganisms. Molecular tracer
compounds added to the mud allow rapid quantification of the level of mud contamination, and
permittheanalystto know (ina statisticalsense)whether theorganicand biologicaloadina
particularsample could havecome entirelyfrom thedrillingmud. Specifictracersmentioned
includefluorinatedhydrocarbons(e.g.,perfluoromethlycyclohexane),and latexbeads lacedwith
fluorescent dyes.
RECOMMENDATION BY CAPTEM:
A subcommittee consisting of regular CAPTEM members and pro tempore members selected for
their expertises (listed below) considered the proposed scheme of deploying molecular tracer
materials, as well as an alternative scheme of monitoring terrestrial contamination using witness
plates. The subcommittee was impressed with the Athena team's efforts to understand and
control round.trip terrestrial contamination, and agreed that efforts to understand, monitor, and
mitigate such contamination should begin now. However, the subcommittee found that
intentionally introducing tracer contaminants onto the Athena package and the Rover would not
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be advisableas described.Some det_lsofour concernsaredescribedbelow. There was much
more supportfortheconceptofusingwitnessplatesto monitor contaminationend-to-end:before
launch,inspace,on Mars, and afterreturnto Earth.
In general, the subcommittee was uncomfortable with the idea of intentionally deploying
contaminant materials onto the Athena samples because of their possible effects on later analyses.
The greatest concern was with tracer materials that contained the elements H, C, N= and O, which
might have significant deleterious effects on Earth-based analyses focused on the biotic, pre-
biotic, and climate history of Mars. Isotopically labeled tracer molecules could also lend
undesirable complications to isotopic analyses. In addition, it was suggested that fluorescent
tracermaterials(e.g.,latexspheres)might complicatesubsequentbiochemicalanalysesthatuse
fluorescentmarkers. The subcommitteealsoexploredthe concept of usingbio-mimics,like
human-created,artificialDNA orRNA sequencesinproteincoats,astracers;but itwas felthat
theseparticulatescould needlesslycomplicatesensitiveanalysesforultra-tracebiologicmolecules
and structures.Itwas alsonotedthatintentionaladdition0ftracermoleculeswould requirethat
each returnedsample be analyzedforthosemolecules,probablyatverylow concentrationlevels.
Such analysescouldrequiresignificantsamplemass (leavinglessforother studies),or inthecase
of non-destructive analyses, further contaminate the sample being analyzed.
One suggestedimplementationof themoleculartracertechniquewould be fortracersto be
introducedintothedrillcoreassemblytomonitorcontaminationduringdrilling.The
subcommittee feltthatintentionalcontaminationduringdrillingwas not necessary,asthecoring
processitselfwould likelyadd detectablechemicaltracersto thesamples. Materialsfrom the drill
bit and core sleeve are likely to be abraded during drilling, be rubbed onto rock core surfaces, and
mixed intodrillcuttings(dust).Analysisofcoresleevematerialrubbed onto the rock core
surfacescouldbe used toevaluatesurfacecontamination.Also,drillcuttingswillentertherock
core..,longfracturesand pores. So analysisof returnedcoresfortracesof abraded dr/llcouldbe
used toevaluatepaniculatetransport.For example,a type oftungstencarbide(WC) commonly
used indrillbitscontains6% cobaltand detectablelevelsof tantalum. Ifdrillcuttings0ncluding
bitmaterial)have entereda drillcore sample,theirpresencewillbe readilyknown by elevated
abundances ofcobalt(detectableatverylow concentrationsby neutron activationanalysis),and
couldbe confirmedby elevatedabundances of tungstenand tantalum. Use of drillmaterialasan
"inherent tracer" will indicate whether the interior of each drill core communicated with the
ex'terior during the mission; like the proposed molecular tracer scheme, it will not provide direct
evidence of terrestrial contamination.
The subcommitteedid not feelthatan analogybetween thecontaminationduringterrestrial
drillingand thecontaminationanticipatedduringthe2001 missionwas completelyappropriate
Unliketerrestrialdrilling,potentialsourcesand processesof terrestriaJcontaminationduringMars
missionoperationsarenot understoodwelland thesubcommittee suspectedthatsome potential
routesof contaminationcouldbypassthoseof tracerdelivery.Ifallsourcesofcontamination
cannot be traced effectively, then tracers could potentially be more confounding than helpful. For
example, consider a scenario in which a molecular tracer is applied to non-sterile rover
components,but thatthelargestpotentialsourceofbiologicalcontaminationisairbornedust
during Athena/Rover integration. These particulates are likely to be redistributed during launch:
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and duringthezero-gravitycruisetoMars, and couldpossiblymigratethen to the returnsample
containerand to thereturnedsample,independentof any tracermovement. The outcome of this
scenariowould be a returnsample withviable(terrestrial)microorganisms but no molecular
tracer.Logic would indicate,falsely,thattheorganismsoriginatedon Mars. Inthisscenario,an
effectivetracerwould have to permeate theenvironmentduringintegrationinapproximatelythe
same way as ambient microorganisms.The Athena payload instrumentsand the rover
components willeach experiencea sequence ofpotentiallycontaminatingenvironments before
reachingMars. An effectivetracerscheme would requirethatevery potentialsourceof
contaminationineach environmentbe understood,and thateach be dosed with an appropriate
tracer.Unless sterilizationand containmentprotocolscan limitpotentialcontaminationto a few
well-defin_pathways,an effectivetracerimplementationseems problematic.
On the other hand, the subcommittee felt that witness plates had the potential to monitor all types
of contamination, including round-trip terrestrial contamination, without an a priori
understanding of all possible contamination processes. The subcommittee noted that the Athena
rover would inevitably carry some Earthly materials (organic, biologic, and anthropogenic), which
could themselves be analyzed as direct measures of contamination. The subcommittee further
noted that data from witness plates or similar information were required as boundary conditions in
order to design and quantify the molecular tracer technique. Thus, the sub-committee
recommends that potential sources and processes of contamination be monitored through a series
ofwitness plates. Some plates would be exposed to the same environment and potential
contaminants as the Athena and Rover hardware on Earth until as late as possible before launch.
Another witness plate would be exposed during the cruise phase to Mars, and closed on arrival.
Another witness plate would be on the Athena package or Rover'before and during Mars during
operations to monitor terrestrial material that might enter the returned samples on Mars, All these
witness plates would be returned to Earth for analysis and evaluation of potential round-trip
terrestrial contamination.
The witness plate method for detecting contamination also has limitations. To be effective,
witness plates would need to be exposed to all the same environments and conditions as the
Athena payload and rover, and some would need to experience all sources of potential
contamination except the Martian surface and samples. Witness plates, as a group, would be of
limited effectiveness if significant "links" in this chain are broken, or if all were directly exposed to
the Martian enviionment. In addition, witness plates will not provide a positive signal of
contamination, but only a potential source for contaminant matching. For example, if a viable
microorganism should be detected in a sample, it seems likely that release from quarantine would
require that the very same kind of organism could also be detected on a protected witness
coupon. At low contamination rates, with a diverse source community of microorganisms, this is
unlikely. Conversely, if contamination rates are high, it might prove technically impossible to
match all the detected organisms before the coupon sample is consumed. Thus, again, some idea
of the likely contaminant Io_.d and the methods to be used for analysis must be determined before
an effective strategy can be formulated.
The subcommittee was aware that the use of witness plates has cost and mass consequences for
the mission. The use of witness plates on Earth, both before launch and after sample return, would
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probably require relatively modest expenditures. Sample holder surfaces could act as witness
plates for contamination summed over the whole sample return mission, and thus incur little cost
or eft'on. But a witness plate that would be closed a._er the cruise phase to Mars, a witness to
"out-bound" terrestrial contaminants, might have significant cost and mass consequences. A
mechanism would be needed to close the plate upon arrival at Mars. And this witness plate would
have to be on the return sample container, so it could be retrieved and returned to Earth for
analysis.
SUMMAKY
Although CAFrEM applauds the efforts of the Athena team to evaluate terrestrial contamination
o£ returned Mars samples, CAPTEM views the molecular tracer technique (as presented) as
flawed. With limited understanding of the processes by which the returned samples might be
contaminated with round-trip terrestrial materials, a molecular tracer program cannot be properly
designed. Dr. Squyres and Dr. Onstott indicated that some testing of potential contamination
routes is proposed. These activities should be undertaken as soon as possible, to guide
contamination control efforts. These exploratory experiments should include exposing control
materialstoallanticipatednvironmentsthroughwhich theMars landerwillpass,including
launchpad,and ifpossible,launchconditions.Any proposedmethod fordetectingcontamination
shouldbe testedinthisway, assoon aspossible.
CAPTEM Molecular Tracer Subcommittee:
Member
!. Allton
Dr. D. Bogard
Dr. K. Clayton
Dr. J. Jones (chair)
Dr. L. Leshin
Dr. D, Lindstrom
Dr. J. Moldowan
Dr. T. Stevens
Dr. A. Treiman (vice-chair)
Clean room techniques
Noble gas geochemistry
Stable isotope 8eocheani_ry
Experimental geochemistry
Ion microprobe analysis
Analytical geochemistry
Organic geochemistry/biomarkers
Biology in extreme environments
Igneous/metamorphic petrology
Affiliation
Lockheed-Martin
NASA/ISC
U. Chicago
NASA/JSC
UCLA
NASA/ISC
Stanford U.
Pacific Northwest Lab.
Lunar & Planetary Inst.
_AP'rEM
'_ _'"_ TracerD_s - Chair, Molecular
Subcommittee (CAPTEM)
.H. Treiman - Vice-Chair, Molecular
TracerSubcommittee (CAPTEM)
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MEMORANDUM
To:
From:
Subject:
Michael H. Cart, Chair, MSHARP
aejmaalt ___
J.J. Papike, Chair, CAPTE_
| I U
CAPTEM Review of Issue._ Rai_ed _y "
Steve Squyres Concerning Collection
of Mardan Samples
Date: April 9, 1998
In addition to the CAPTEM review of the molecular tracer concept (earlier
mailing to MSHARP), Steve Squyres asked for input on several other
sampling issues described in the attachment. CAPTEM formally passes these
recommendations to MSHARP for further consideration and action.
XC: MSHARP Committee Members
S. Squyres
S. Saunders
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3-21-98 Sample Strategy Meeting
Athena 2001 Sample Collection and Storage:
Potential Problems and Solutions
Report Prepared by CAPTEM
This report is presented in a series of bullets so the impact of the conclusions is not lost in
wasted prose. Each point discussed is divided into the points raised for debate and the
consensus reached by the sub.committee.
Sub-Committee Members:
C. Allen, Johnson Space Center
D. Des Marais - NASA/AMF.S
B. Jolliff- Washington University, St Louis
C.R. Neal - University of Notre Dame
J. Papike - University of New Mexico
G. Ryder, Lunar & Planetary Institute
OVERVIEW
The return of martian rock samples in pristine condition is vital for answering many
scientific questions regarding the evolution of Mars and the possibility of life having
existed on this planet. The sub-committee of CAPTEM, at the request of Steve Squyres,
met to discuss five subjects related to the type, collection, and storage of samples by the
2001 Athena Mission:
I. Core Diameter
2. Sample-Sample Contact
3. Trace-Element Contamination
4. Soil Sample/Rock Sample Ratio
5. Seal Materials/Use of Teflon.
The current sample container contains 60 sample slots 5 cm deep which, if all are filled,
means 300-350 grams of sample would be collected. NOTE: the corer has a maximttm
depth penetration of 5 cm but.extracts this in two 2.5 cm samples.
I. CORE DIAMETER.
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.Debate: ifthe diameter of the cores was smallerthat7 ram, drillingwould be
fasterwhich would allow bettersampling of a singlerock.
Assuming 3 g/cm J density, a 5 cm core of 7 mm diameter yields 5.8 g. A 5 ram
core reduces this mass by a factor of 2.
A smaller diameter core radically increases the contamination effects from the drill
bit.
The larger diameter core allows for better sampling of unconsolidated soil material -
with the new sample container depth (5 cm), soil samples could be collected clown
to 3-4 cm.
_: 7 mm diameteristhe best diameterfor thecorer in order to collected
thebestsamples whilemaintainingefficientdrillingand core recovery.
SAMPLE-SAMPLE CONTACT.
D.F,aAZIZ: The maximum length of any single core is 2.5 cm. In order to best use
the sample container, two cores need to be put in the same sample slot.
Questions:
(a) should samples from different rocks be put in the same slot one on top of the
other?
(b) Should cores from the same rock be put on top of one another as the deepest
(freshest) surface of the second core would then be in contact with weathered
outersurfaceof thefastcore?
The sample container could conceivably be 6 cm in depth, so a gap could be left
between cores. However, these could move together during rover motions, lift off
and impact.
Sample cross contaminationisa big issue and experimentscenteredon drillingof
differentrock typesby thecorer without cleaningof the drillbitbetween samples
are required(withsubsequent geochemical analyses)priortolaunch.
If only one 2.5 cm long core is put in each sample slot, only half the mass could be
returned a significant portion of which could be used up in "Planetary
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Contamination Experiments" upon return as the mission plans to look at diverse
rocks types, each of which would have to be tested for biological diversity.
.C.D._,5,/,_iI_: It is most desirable to bring back the largest sample mass as
possible, without compromising these samples by cross contamination.
Therefore, the recommended standard procedure should be that each rock selected
for sampling have two cores extracted from the same hole and placed in the same
sample slot (it is NOT desirable to mix fithologies within the same sample container
unless absolutely necessary). This approach will mean that between every other
core, no travel time is necessary so drilling/sampling time (dependent on the fife of
the baneries) is maximized along with sample return (through optimal use of the
sample container). In addition, this approach dramatically reduces the risk of
sample cross-contamination.
The surfaces of each core will be examined by the instrument array prior to storing
in order to evaluate any contact between cores that may have occurred during the
trip back to Earth.
The second 2.5cm core willbe lessconmminamd with the rock sample previously
cored (orfrom thewire brush used toclean the bitbetween samples) as thiswould
be removed duringthefast2.5cm core. REMEMBER: as the fastcore goes down
the sample slot,itleavesdust - thereforeitisessentialto have the same lithology
placedon top of this.
As therewillbe two cores from the same rock for almost allsamples collected,it
may be feasible to put half of the core on reserve for future analysis.
The fast sample drilled will only be 2.S cm - the fast sample holder will be half full
- this way the weathered sudace remains relatively undisturbed and sample cross
contaminationisavoided (thisisthe fastsample).
3. CONSOLIDATED ROCK SAMPLE/UNCONSOLIDATED SOUL SAMPLE
RAT[O,
DESATE: Sixty (60) sample slots 7 mm diameter and 5 cm long are available.
present ratio is 53:7. This ratio depends on:
The
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a) timerequiredforrockcoring;
b) timerequiredforsoilsampling;
c) diversityof soils- more area willbe traversedthan in
pathfinder,sogreatersoildiversitycouldbe encountered.
Viking or even
NOTE: the terms "soil"isused hereto mean unconsolidated/friablematerialonly
and representssand& siltsizefractions.
]?s,F,l_z_.r;_:the2005 missionwillcollecta contingencysoilsample.
Ifthesoilisreasonablycompact,a samplecouldbe takenwiththedrillbit.
_: The ratio f rocksto soilsshould be 50*:I0 so thatsoildiversity
issues can be addressed. This committee recommends that attempts be made to
collecttwo wind blown dust samples (Martian "loess")so crustalaverage
compositionscanbe defined-thiswillbe material< 100 gm as thisisthe size
rangethatcan be moved by themartianatmosphere.
* the actual number of available slots for cores will be 49 because a pure, sterilized
earth material (quartzite?) will be taken to and brought back from Mars in order to
assess potential contamination (organic & inorganic) picked up during the mission.
4. TRACE ELEMENT CONTAMINATION.
DEBATE: Assuming the cached samples will be sealed prior to lift off and the
sample container will not be breached upon impact, sources of contamination of the
Mars samples will be:
a) DrillBitand Core Housing;
b) Push Rod;
c) "Sheath"atthefrontendoftheanalyticalinstruments;
d) Wire Brush fordrillbitcleaning;
e) Non-return"door"on sampleslottopreventsample from fallingout (butsee
5.).
While the drill bit design is not finalized, it is accepted that materials which offer the
bestdrillingperformance(cm perwatthour)shouldbe chosen. This willprobably
be tungstencarbidecoatedwithsiliconnitride.
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Tungsten carbide contamination of a rock sample seriously affects the analysis of
W, C, Platinum Group Elements, Co, Zr, Nb, Hf, Ta and also W-Hf, Lu-Hf, +
Re-Os isotope determinations.
The wear on the drill bit will be assessed on the surface through force/torque
required to drill, current sensing(cm per watt hour), and visual inspection of the
drill bit.
Inclusion of an enriched isotope tracer in the manufacture of the drill bit was
discussed, and Steve Squyres will look into this, but offered no guarantees as to the
inclusion of such material.
_: It is understood that mission design requires that drill bits be
manufactured that are durable and efficiently produce the best cores. Drill bit and
core housing contamination needs to be understood.
• Experimentson rocks of different lithologies and permeabilities' are required;
• The drill bit used in these experiments shouldbo analyzed*;
• When the final drill bits, push rod, sheaths, wire brush, sample slot doors are
manufactured, spares should be made at the same time so their composition can
be determined ® as well as any elemental zonation ° in these materials.
# Rocks of different permeabilities need to be drilled in order assess contaminant
penetration into the interior of the core.
@ As many elements as possible should be quantified for these materials and by
different analytical methods.
S. SEAL MATERIALS/TEFLON.
D_x'r_: Although the sample container is under design, but each sample slot could
have an pleated Teflon sleeve which would allow for slight expansion when the
core is inserted, thus ensuring a tight fit of sample in the tube. Each sample tube
could be surrounded by a deformable material to absorb vibrations and impact.
The end of each sample slot could have an iris-like door to prevent the sample from
falling out, especially inportant for friable soil samples if they are gathered using the
drill bit. However, the sample container may not be _aled.
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PROat_M: Staticbuildup on the tefloncould cause dust buildup around each
individualsampleslot(andthereforepotentialcontaminationof)hesample)
Sample holderdesignisongoing-planetarycontaminationrequirementsareunclear
and arebeingdefinedby MSHARP.
May seal the sample holder as one unit after all samples have been collected and
stored, rather than each sample slot having a sealed door (cost). It is desirable to
keep as much dust out of the sample container slots as possible.
but the samples need to tightly fit in the slots in order to prevent them "rattling
around" during rover movement, lift off, and impact back on the earth. Deformable
material m be placed around the sample slots to absorb impacts.
_: Teflon is good! All materials which will surround the sample should
be made of Teflon, including the seals and sample slot doors. However, make sure
that pure Teflon is used - this may requite assaying of compnent material.
If the sample container itself is to be made of an aluminum alloy, this material also
needs to assayed to define the elements present. Guidelines need to be defined on
what Al-alloys are accaptable.
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Symposium -- Rational Basis for Biocontainment
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the American Biological
Safety Association (ABSA) sponsored a symposium titled "Rational Basis for
Biocontainment" in Atlanta, GA January 17-20. ABSA is the professionalsociety
devoted tosafedesignand operationinmicrobiology laboratories.The mission of the
symposium was "to providean interactiveforum forevaluatingstrategiesformodern
laboratorydesign and operation;tostimulateprospectivethinkingand proactivedialogue
for findingnew solutionsforcontainment; and to publisha compendium of presentations
and discussionsthatwillserveas a valuableresource forthoseembarking on laboratory
renovationsor new construction."The symposium was hostedby Dr. Jonathan
Richmond, Directorof the Officeof Health and SafetyforC'DC. Dr. Richmond has
served as an advisortoNASA concerning biosafetyissuesof Mars sample return.
The symposium was particularly valuable in three areas related to Mars samples:
communication between NASA and the biosafety community, sterilization of processing
cabinets and geologic samples, and alternatives to containment laboratory construction.
AstromaterialsPresentation Margaret Race and Dr. Manuel Barbieto (Biological
SafetyOfficer,US Department of Agriculture)presenteda tutorialon the biosafety
issuesof theApollo program and Mars sample return.Severalaudience members
had participatedinthedesignand operationof the Lunar ReceivingLaboratory but
thiswas thefirstpresentationof Mars sample plansand concernsto the bioSafety
community.
Stecilizationof vr_essin¢ cabinetsand HEPA filters Currentplanning to upgrade
the JSC MeteoriteProcessingLaboratory,as well as planningforMars sample
laboratories,includesthe abilitytosterilizeand decontaminate processingcabinets.
The most common sterilizationtechniques inmicrobiologicallaboratoriesinvolve the
use of gases(formaldehyde or ethylene oxide)and organicliquids.These techniques
killthe organisms but inevitablyleaveorganic residues.This isa seriousconcern for
Mars meteoritesand returnedsamples, which areand willbe examined fortrace
levels of organics.
An alternativethatseems worth investigatingisthe use of vaporizedhydrogen
peroxide (VHP). This techniquehas been shown effectiveinkillingbacterialspores
and viruses,while leavinga minimum of organic residue.Research underway atthe
Baker Company, a major supplierof biologicalsafetycabinets,isdefiningthe
equipment and operatingparameters appropriateto VHP sterilizationf biological
safetycabinetsand HEPA filters.Note thata more aggressiveversion,utilizing
hydrogen peroxide plasn3a,isplanned forsterilizingportionsof the2001 lander.
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Appendix C. Acronyms and Unusual Terms
A5
ALH84001
APXS
Athena
Ariane 5
martian Antarctica meteorite with possible signs of life
alpha proton X-ray spectrometer
(rover for Mars 2003 and 2005 missions)
BSL biosafety level
CAPTEM
CDC
cpm
Curation and Analysis Planning Team for Extraterrestrial
Materials
Center for Disease Control (Atlanta, GA)
counts per minute
DIII
duricrust
Delta III
fine-grained debris close to the surface cemented to form a
crust a few millimeters thick; probably a cement of soluable
mobile salts similar information to the caliche crusts on dry
lake beds
EEV
ERV
Earth Entry Vehicle
Earth Return Vehicle
HEPA
ICBC
ISS
JSC
LDEF
LEO
LPI
LPS
LR
LSAPT
MAV
metazoa
MSHARP
NIH
NRA
NRC
high efficiency particulate air (filter)
Interagency Committee on Back Contamination
International Space Station
Johnson Space Center (Houston, TX)
Long Duration Exposure Facility
low Earth orbit
Lunar and Planetary Institute (Houston TX)
Lipopolysaccharides
labeled release
Lunar Sample Analysis and Planning Team
Mars Ascent Vehicle
many celled animals as distinct from single-celled protozoa
Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel
National Institutes of Health
NASA Research Announcement
National Research Council
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ppb
PET
protozoa
SCF
SEM
SETI
SRF
SRM
TBD
TGISR
Tetrahymena
partsperbillion
PreliminaryExaminationTeam
single-celledor acellularanimals
samplecurationfacility
scanningelectronmicroscope
Searchfor ExtraterrestrialIntelligence
samplereceivingfacility
samplereturnmission
to bedetermined
TaskGroupon Issuesin SampleReturn(NationalResearch
Council);alsoreferredto astheNRC TaskGroup
Tetrahymenathermophilais aunicellular,ciliated freshwater
protozoan.It is well suitedfor researchin thatceilscanbe
grownovernightto densitiesof 100,000cellsperml or more.
Thesecellsexhibit awiderepertoireof behaviorsthatcan
serveasmodelsystemsfor investigativeanalysis.
ULPA
UV
XRFS
Ultra low penetrationair (filter)
ultraviolet
X-ray fluorescentspectrometry
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